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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HARM THAT RUSSIAN AND
CHINESE ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS CAN INFLICT
ON AMERICAN SOCIETY
Bryce L. Hoekenga, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1997
Determining which of the two main ethnic organized
crime groups emerging in America poses a greater threat
to society was the focus of this study. One group is from
or is closely linked to Russia and the other group is
from or is closely linked to China.
The aspects of each group that were discussed
include their origins, their spread to America, how they
are structured, their membership sizes, the types of
crimes they commit, and how law enforcement has responded
to each group. The aspects that were compared between the
two groups include their levels of sophistication, the
seriousness and diversity of the crimes they commit, and
each group's ability to operate nationwide and affect the
average American.
The conclusion of this study is that Russian orga
nized criminals pose a greater threat to American society
than Chinese organized criminals pose.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Reason to study Organized Crime
In 1977 an FBI agent posing as a jewel thief infil
trated one of America's most powerful La cosa Nostra
organizations, the Bonanno crime family, by befriending
an unsuspecting soldier in the family, Benjamin Ruggiero.
Joseph Pistone, under the alias of Donnie Brasco, faked
his loyalty to the Bonanno family, one of New York City's
five La Cosa Nostra families, until shortly after May 14,
1981 when a captain in the family, Dominick Napolitano,
commanded him to kill a rival family member, Anthony
Indelicato. Pistone left the underworld on July 26, 1981
with enough information to help convict over 100 mob
sters, which is exactly what he did. (Pistone 12)
Pistone so infuriated some La Cosa Nostra members
that a contract offering $500,000 for his life and/or the
lives of his wife and three daughters was up for the tak
ing. The contract was atypical for La Cosa Nostra. Under
traditional Mob rules, both law enforcement agents and
the families of targeted individuals were not to be
harmed. These rules were not humanitarian gestures; they
were meant to prevent unwanted attention to the enter1
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prise. (O'Brien 20) Law enforcers knew that the contract
could only be canceled from the top. The top was Paul
Castellano, head of America's most powerful La Cosa Nos
tra organization, the Gambino crime family in New York
City. Although each family had its own boss, Castellano

was the capo di tutti capi, the boss of bosses, the first

among equals, and his input carried the most weight
within La Cosa Nostra. Law enforcers also knew that the
best way to contact Castellano would be to drop in at his
house uninvited - something very few people did.
Castellano, a recluse, had a well-secured multimil
lion-dollar mansion in Staten Island's upscale Todt Hill
neighborhood. The house's location, on the highest point
of land in all of New York City, gave him a splendid view
of the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge. Inside he had large
lamps covered in gold leaf and shaped like Renaissance
sculptures. In the back yard was an Olympic-size swimming
pool. (O'Brien 19, 20) His home was nicknamed the "White
House" because it resembles the real White House in Wash
ington, D.C. FBI Special Agents Joseph O'Brien and Frank
Spero had the job of visiting Castellano to tell him to
cancel the contract. standing at his front door intimi
dated the agents. An unlikely threat of physical danger
didn't intimidate them; it was the opulence of
Castellano's home which reminded them of the power and
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wealth of the enterprise he led. While looking at his
semicircular driveway, they imagined all the mobsters and
legitimate businessmen that came to him in their Cadil
lacs and Jaguars seeking advice and favors. They felt
they were dropping in on the underworld equivalent of the
chairman of General Motors. (O'Brien 24)
Indeed, Castellano was a rich man. Organized crime
generates a staggering amount of wealth and is an immense
drain on the U.S. economy. The National Strategy Informa
tion Center in Washington estimated in 1993 the annual
worldwide profits of organized crime to be about $1 tril
lion, almost the amount of the U.S. federal budget.
(Elliott 22) studies estimate that organized crime annu
ally saps up to $500 billion from the U.S. economy. (Ryan
1, 3) That amount is nearly twice what U.S. taxpayers
spent on national defense in 1996, which was $254.4 bil
lion.
Organized criminals typically engage in drug traf
ficking, extortion, prostitution, pornography, illegal
gambling, money laundering, skimming, loansharking, brib
ing police, blackmail, labor racketeering, murder, infil
trating legitimate business, corrupting public officials,
and more. In pursuit of every avenue where money can be
made, organized crime is more omnipresent than most peo
ple realize. Such crime groups can directly or indirectly
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affect all Americans but they operate in such a stealthy
and subtle way that the average person has no way of
knowing if he or she has been victimized.
Imagine you live in New York City and you have
decided to walk to the corner store to buy a few grocer
ies. You have just put on your jacket but you may not
realize that part of the money you spent on that jacket
may have gone to organized criminals. The Gambino family
was involved in New York's clothing industry and in 1991
the family was charged with taking payoffs ranging from
$3.50 to $7.50 for every $100 worth of clothing. (Ryan 8)
See that sidewalk you are on? About $1 to $2 of the
amount spent on each yard of concrete in New York went to
criminal organizations due to their control of the con
struction industry. (Ryan 7) New York has the nation's
highest construction costs thanks in part to this con
trol. See that trash on the curb? The company that hauls
it away was likely involved with organized crime.
(O'Brien 29). Do you know who owns the store you are
going to? The Gambinos controlled two supermarket chains.
(O'Brien 71) Do you plan on buying chicken? Part of what
you pay may go into the Gambino family's pockets. The
family owned a wholesale company in Brooklyn, Dial Meat
Purveyors Inc., which distributed to over 300 retail
butchers. (O'Brien 70) How about fish? If it passed
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through New York's Fulton Fish Market, there is a chance
that up to half of what you pay will go to New York's
Genovese crime family. (Ryan 8)
These inflated costs diminish our quality of life
but determining how much harm organized crime inflicts on
society can be difficult. For many reasons, victims usu
ally do not report the crime and when a report is filed,
information on the incident will not necessarily state
whether or not the alleged criminal is linked to orga
nized crime. (Ryan 154)
Organized crime is increasingly becoming an interna
tional problem. In recent decades many countries, includ
ing Russia, have liberalized their emigration policies,
thus allowing people to flow more freely over borders.
Many organized criminals who believe America is the land
of opportunity are moving here. Also, money laundering
has become easier in the computer age. Electonic fund
transfer systems can zip billions of dollars in illicit
�}

proceeds across oceans in seconds. The potential for
Russian organized criminals to smuggle nuclear material
to terrorists or rogue nations is one of many interna
tional crimes that can affect America. To help combat the
problem, the FBI has increasingly been cooperating with
and training law enforcement agents in Eastern Europe.
(Freeh 1) Under communism, Russian law enforcers had few
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legal tools to help them fight organized crime there. The
fall of communism enabled experienced Russian crime
groups to commit their soph�sticated crimes abroad. The
FBI opened a legal attache office in Moscow to work with
Russian law enforcers. Between July 1994 and May 1996,
the number of cases the FBI worked on in Moscow jumped
from 20 to over 200. (Freeh 4)
Narcotics trafficking has become the main income
source for organized crime and the U.S. economy's most
successful growth industry. over a million arrests made
annually in America involve illegal drugs. About 80 per
cent of all arrests are for the alleged use of narcotics.
(Schmidt 585) The Drug Policy Information Clearing House
estimated that Americans spent $48.7 billion on illicit
drugs in 1993. Chinese and Nigerian organized crime
groups handle most of the heroin brought into America and
the Columbian cartels supply a major portion of the
cocaine found here. outlaw motorcycle gangs, La Cosa Nos
tra, and e1nerging organized criminals from Jamaica, Haiti
• and the Dominican Republic are the main distributors of
70 percent of the marijuana in America. (Ryan 9) In terms
of drug abuse, not all costs to society are monetary.
Such abuse can lead to addiction, ruined careers, ruined
families, serious health problems, violence, death and
other problems that may be difficult to measure.
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Just as the world is rapidly changing with technol
ogy and wide-spread democratization, so too is organized
crime rapidly changing. To survive, organized crime must
be as dynamic as society and as increasingly clever as
law enforcement. The thesis will offer insight into how
organized crime has evolved and what it may look like in
the future. And this may help society and law enforcement
cope with such crime.
The Purpose of the Thesis
When many people think of organized criminals they
think of the Italian-American group, La Cosa Nostra, and
how it is portrayed in Francis Ford Coppola's 1972 film,
The Godfather. Of all ethnic crime groups in America, La

Cosa Nostra still poses the greatest threat to American
society. (Tri-state 35, Kleinknecht 290-291) But due in
)

part to La Cosa Nostra's decline, other ethnic groups are
filling the void and gaining power. Organized crime is
indeed an equal-opportunity occupation. Other crime
groups that have found their way to America include those
from the West Indies, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern
Europe. Law enforcers and academics agree that the two
main emerging groups in America are Russian and Chinese
so this thesis will discuss and compare only these two
groups to determine which one has a greater potential to
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harm American society. (Chin 214, Sterling 152, Tri-state
i, 35) To do this, the thesis will review the relevant
literature to evaluate each group's level of sophistica
tion, and the seriousness and diversity of the types of
crimes they commit. The thesis will also compare each
group's ability to operate nationwide and to affect the
average American. We will then determine which group
poses the greatest threat to American society. But first,
we will begin by defining organized crime and terms
related to organized crime. This chapter's last section
will preview the remaining chapters.
Defining Organized Crime and Terms Related to
Organized Crime
Very few clear definitions of organized crime exist.
We may know organized crime when we see it or hear about
it but actually pinning down a simple definition of what
it is can be difficult. To worsen matters, law enforcers,
academics and other writers tend to redefine organized
crime groups as such groups evolve. The main goal in
defining organized crime is determining the difference
between non-organized crime and organized crime. This
section will use several source types, such as the FBI
and academics, to help us define organized crime.
J

Although the thesis will focus on Chinese and Russian organized crime,· La Cosa Nostra will be mentioned
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throughout the thesis since the organization is still
America's most powerful organized crime group and Chinese
and Russian organized crime groups sometimes conflict
with and sometimes cooperate with it. Therefore, this
section will discuss the term "La Cosa Nostra" and dis
cuss why the thesis will use the term instead of its
other common moniker, the "Mafia". Since terms involving
Chinese and Russian organized crime, such as the Chinese
secret societies and criminally-influenced tongs, will be
explained and discussed in Chapters IV and V, their defi
nitions will be only included in those chapters to avoid
redundancy in the thesis.
Before we define organized crime, we must realize
that organized crime is an activity or behavior and not a
group or organization. In other words, La Cosa Nostra is
not organized crime; La Cosa Nostra is a group that com
mits organized crime. Since organized crime is what orga
nized crime groups do, we must know the characteristics
of organized crime groups. According to the FBI, they are
"conti_nuing criminal conspiracies having an organiza
tional structure, fed by fear and corruption and moti
vated by greed." (FBI 1) Academics, who are more exhaus
tive when describing the characteristics, say such groups
have durability, continuity, sophistication, a bureaucra
0

tic hierarchy, a functional division of labor, an element
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of conspiracy, an internal discipline system, and members
from society's legitimate and criminal sectors. They com
mit crime for a profit, they sometimes use, or threaten
to use, violence to reach their objectives, they provide
illegal goods and services to meet public demand and they
try to protect themselves from law enforcement and prose
cution by using methods such as corrupting public offi
cials. (Ryan 5, 6, Albanese 5, Maltz 26-31) A group with
those characteristics is an organized crime group. The
difference between an organized crime group and a legiti
mate group may be determined by measuring the amount of
harm the groups cause. For example, as Patrick Ryan
notes, the difference between loansharking and legitimate
loaning is the interest rate charged and the methods used
to collect on loan defaults. (Ryan 7)
The difference between organized and non-organized
crime could be determined not by categorizing the type of
crime that is committed, but by evaluating the circum
stances surrounding the crime. To help us understand the
differing circumstances that can surround a crime we can
use auto theft as an example. Imagine members of a group
stealing Acuras and Range Rovers less than two years old
in the Los Angeles area. The vehicles are stripped,
rebuilt and given new bogus vehicle identification num
bers by other members of the group at a nondescript ware-
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house in suburban San Fransisco. The vehicles are then
shipped to Warsaw, Poland where another group sells them
to waiting customers. Imagine that this activity contin
ues, or is intended to continue, for at least several
years. Now imagine one or two youths, with few or no con
nections to anyone, who spontaneously steal a car, almost
any kind of car, in a grocery store parking lot. The
first scenario - in which at least a few people cooperate
to commit a planned, on-going crime for a profit - is an
example of organized crime. The second scenario - in
which no extensive cooperation, planning nor duration
occurs - is not an example of organized crime. Some orga
nized crime isn't as complex as what is portrayed in the
first scenario but it offers insight into the difference
between organized and non-organized crime.
Not all crime planned to make a profit for a cooper
ating group of people is organized crime. White-collar
crime, such as insider trading on Wall Street, isn't
organized crime unless an organized crime group is
involved to make a profit. Also, when an organized crime
group member commits a crime, the crime doesn't necessar
ily benefit other group members. If a group member com
mits rape, other group members would unlikely profit from
th� act. We must also realize that someone who isn't an
organized crime group member can still benefit an orga-
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nized crime group. Meyer Lansky was a main financial
advisor for La Casa Nostra and he committed organized
crime that benefited La Casa Nostra, but he never for
mally joined the group. Finally, a subgroup within an
organized crime group, such as a family within La Casa
Nostra, may commit organized crime that won't necessarily
benefit other subgroups within the group. Therefore, for
this thesis, organized crime is crime that benefits, or
is intended to benefit, at least two members of an orga
nized crime group.
To learn why the term "La Casa Nostra" will be used
instead of the commonly used term "Mafia" will require
the latter term's origin in Sicily to be reviewed. The
Italian government abolished feudalism shortly after the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies united with Italy in 1860.
The island of Sicily had owners of cultivatable land, and
peasants who would rent land from its owners and culti
vate it. Due to a weak central government on the main
land, the situation on the island left a power vacuum for
people who would ensure that the landowners received
their rent and ensure that the land was protected from
restless peasants. These people were also to protect the
landowners' privileges which the Italian government was
undermining since the peasants were being liberated. The
landowners recruited middlemen, called "mafiosi", from
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the peasantry to fill the vacuum. The mafiosi extorted
money from the peasants and forced them to sign impossi
ble leases, but they promised the peasants work and con
tracts. The term "mafia" did not refer to an organization
or secret society; it referred to the protection, patron
age and other services that the mafiosi provided in Sic
ily. (Albanese 18-23) Between 1880 and 1920, over 4 mil
lion Italians, mainly Sicilian peasants, emigrated to
America. And with this immigration came a group of Sicil
ians that in America evolved into a criminal secret soci
ety known as the Mafia. Some of the group's counterparts
from mainland Italy, who were based in Naples, also came
and were known as La Camorra. In 1889 a war broke out
between the two group in New York City. The feud claimed
1,400 lives and ended in 1918 when the Mafia absorbed La
Camorra. (Kleinknecht 37, 39) When Joseph Valachi, a sol
dier in the Genovese family, testified before the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the
McClellan Committee) in 1963, he said what was known as
the Mafia was actually called, by the organization's mem
bers, La Cosa Nostra, which means "Our Thing". Nonmembers
have also called La Cosa Nostra the "Mob" and the "Syndi
cate". Bonanno family boss Joseph Bonanno wrote in his
1983 biography that some members called,the enterprise
"our Tradition" or "union Siciliano". (Bonanno 145) Since
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nonmembers called the group the Mafia and members com
monly called it La Cosa Nostra, the latter term must be
more accurate and will therefore be used for the thesis.
Areas in the thesis where La Cosa Nostra is frequently
mentioned may use the "Mob" to avoid repetition.
The Chapters Ahead
The thesis will now begin to explore the aspects of
modern organized crime that will ultimately help us
determine which of the two main ethnic crime groups
emerging in America, Chinese and Russian, has a greater
potential to harm American society. These aspects include
how the FBI confronted La Cosa Nostra, immigration to
America, how other ethnic crime groups are emerging in
America and how these groups operate here.
To avoid informing organized crime groups how they
are being monitored, the FBI will not disclose its inves

tigative techniques in any specific way. But several
tools that the FBI uses, such as those originating from
legislation, can be discussed. Chapter II will focus on
how the FBI has battled La Cosa Nostra in the past,
before the new ethnic crime became major threats. This
will give us historical insight into the methods used in
prosecuting Russian and Chinese crime groups.
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By focusing on Chinese and Russian organized crime
groups, this thesis should not imply that these are the
only two dangerous groups emerging in America. This would
be misleading. Many different law-abiding ethnic groups
are making America their home and with them sometimes
comes a criminal element. Chapter III will discuss modern
trends in immigration and how this immigration can facil
itate the emergence of ethnic crime groups. This chapter
will also explore two emerging crime groups with signifi
cant power, the Japanese Yakuza and Jose Miguel Battle's
Cuban Corporation. Evaluating these two groups will help
us realize how the more powerful Chinese and Russian
crime groups differ from other crime groups in terms of
the amount of havoc they can wreak on American society.
Chapters IV and V will showcase Russian and Chinese
organized crime groups respectively. Every aspect of each
group will be discussed to help us determine which group
poses the greatest threat to American society. This will
be determined in Chapter VI by contrasting the two
groups. Also in Chapter VI, our thesis will conclude and
our final expectation will be offered.

CHAPTER II
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO LA COSA NOSTRA
Introduction
La Cosa Nostra monopolized organized crime for
decades so this chapter will focus on the FBI's investi
gation of La Cosa Nostra to provide an historical analy
sis of how the bureau has battled organized crime in the
last 40 years.. The chapter will include some events in La
Cosa Nostra that led to government action and how this
action helped lead to La Cosa Nostra's decline. The dis
cussion will also offer insight into the background of
many crime-fighting methods and programs still used
today, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga
nizations Act and the Witness Protection Program. We will
explore the monumental amount of work that has gone into
the prosecution of mobsters. The FBI had to completely
revolutionize its investigating techniques to tackle the
Mob and now, with the emerging Russian and Chinese crime
groups, the techniques must be continuously revised.
Knowing how the FBI tackled organized crime in the past
will help us understand how the bureau investigates Rus
sian and Chinese crime groups today. Finally, this chap16
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ter·will help us in later chapters assess the ability of
Russian and Chinese crime groups to evade law enforce
ment and prosecution.
La Cosa Nostra's Rise to Power and the FBI's
Failure to Stop It
The first ethnic groups to form large and successful
organized crime groups in America were Irish and later
Jewish. La Cosa Nostra seized power in the underworld
during Prohibition mainly because Italian gangsters had a
reputation for ruthlessness and because Italians outnum
bered the Irish and the Jews. While the Irish mobsters
tended to use fists and stones in street brawls and Jews
acted more defensively, Italians were inclined to draw
guns and knives to maim or kill. (Kleinknecht 36) La Cosa
Nostra grew until it reached its peak of power in the
1960s with 24 families and about 4,500 members, excluding
the thousands of associates and corrupt public officials
involved with the group.
This growth was caused partly by the FBI's slow res
ponse in confronting the problem, and this slow response
was caused by Director J. Edgar Hoover's long-lasting
denial that La Cosa Nostra existed. several theories and
explanations for Hoover's denial exist. He was extremely
concerned about the FBI's image and about maintai�ing the

bureau's 96-98 percent conviction rate, so he selected
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cases and crimes that could be quickly and easily solved
such.as kidnapping and bank robberies. Taking on a
national crime network, however, would be a monumental
task that many believe Hoover was unwilling to commit to.
Another theory is that he didn't want to jeopardize
relationships with federal, state and local politicians
linked to La Casa Nostra and possibly wealthy, Mob
related friends. (Ungar 392, 393) Some contend that

Hoover himself associated with La Cosa Nostra - specifi
cally Frank Costello, boss of what would become New York
City's Genovese family - or that the Mob had blackmailed
Hoover into keeping his distance by threatening to reveal
his alleged homosexuality. Hoover was possibly in denial
because he didn't know how to tackle La cosa Nostra. To

have an FBI agent infiltrate the Mob would have been dif
ficult since Hoover recruited only clean-cut non-minority
males. Even if infiltration was possible, Hoover likely
would have disapproved it since he believed that high

level criminals could corrupt undercover agents - a risk
he was unwilling to take. (Gentry 328-330) Whatever the
reason(s), the FBI did little to stop La Cosa Nostra
until there was so much evidence that it existed that the
bureau could no longer ignore the problem.

The Kefauver Hearings
La Cesa Nostra received national attention during
the U.S. Senate Special committee to Investigate Orga
nized Crime in Interstate Commerce hearings which began
on May 1, 1950 and ended on Sept. 1, 1951. Sen. Estes

Kefauver, D-Tenn., chaired the group which became com
monly known as the Kefauver Committee. (Kefauver resigned
from the seat in May 1951, three weeks after one of his
1948 campaign contributors, Herbert Brody, was arrested
for running an illegal gambling operation in Nashville.)
The committee's purpose was to learn about organized
crime, and the hearings, held in 14 U.S. cities, were
often televised. The events featured a string of witnes
ses, �including Frank Costello, who invoked their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Costello, the
"Prime Minister of the Underworld," was the star witness
since he was known for being politically well-connected.
His face made the front page of many newspapers but it

was not found on the TV screen. Costello, in his tailor
made suits, insisted that his face not be televised so
the camera operators panned in on his nervous hands
instead. The press called the situation Costello's "hand
ballet." (Davis 68) His exposure eroded his power in La
Cosa Nostra and in 1952 he was sentenced to 18 months in
jail for contempt of the U.S. Senate.
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The Kefauver hearings received mixed reviews. Some
believe Kefauver used the hearings to further his goal of
becoming president. Some believe the hearings presented
what many local public officials already knew and that
the hearings sometimes created myth about organized
crime. But the Kefauver Committee uncovered many facts
and raised public awareness about the problem. The group
concluded that a national organized crime network called
the Mafia operated in many major cities and used inter
state commerce to commit its crimes. The committee also
determined that gambling was La Cosa Nostra's main income
source and that the Mob was a local problem which should
receive limited federal involvement. (Herbert 84, 85)
Hoover, however, continued to deny the Mob's existence.
Vito Genovese's Fight to the Top
In 1957, a power struggle occurred within La Cosa
Nostra. Vito Genovese had replaced Costello as a family
boss and was now eager to be La Casa Nostra's top boss.
Genovese ordered a soldier in his family, Vincent
Gigante, to kill Costello because of the publicity
Costello attracted from the Kefauver hearings. On May 2,
1957, Gigante approached Costello in the lobby of

Costello's Central Park West apartment building, the
Majestic, and shot him in the head. But the bullet only
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grazed his scalp. Costello walked to Roosevelt Hospital
and had his head bandaged. Genovese then ordered another
soldier in his family, Jimmy Squillante, to kill Frank
Scalise, an underboss in what was to become the Gambino
family. Scalise was caught selling memberships into La
Cesa Nostra for up to $50,000 per person and pocketing
the proceeds - actions that clearly violated Mob rules.
Scalise was feeling tomatoes in a Bronx fruit market in
July 1957 when Squillante fatally shot him four times in
the neck and head. (O'Brien 34-36) Genovese's next tar
get was Albert Anastasia, the trigger-happy boss of what
would become the Gambino family. Anastasia - who had also
co-managed La Cesa Nostra's hit squad, Murder Inc., which
killed an estimated 800 people - vowed to avenge the
shootings of Costello and Scalise. Genovese gave the rub
out job to the three Gallo brothers in what would become
New York's Colombo family. on Oct. 25, 1957, Anastasia
went to the barbershop in New York's Park Sheraton Hotel
for a trim and shave. He was leaning back in a barber's
chair with a hot beard-softening towel over his face when
two Gallo brothers walked in and shot five bullets into
his head and back. (Davis 79)

The Apalachin Meeting
Genovese's following actions would become a water
shed event for La Cosa Nostra. He invited about 100 mem
bers of the Mob's top echelon, labor union leaders and
other associates from throughout the country to a meeting
near Apalachin, a rural community in upstate New York.
The meeting, where La Cosa Nostra's four most pressing
issues were to be discussed, was held at the estate of
Joseph Barbara, a Canada Dry soft drink distributor and a
caporegime (captain) in Buffalo's Magaddinno crime fam
ily. The first topic on the agenda was an explanation for
the recent rash of violence and a discussion on who would
replace Anastasia as a family boss. (Before the meeting,
Genovese informally announced that he wanted Anastasia's
underboss, Carlo Gambino, to fill the position. The pro
motion had the blessing of other bosses but they wanted
to discuss the issue before formally proceeding with it.
Gambino eventually assumed the position, though not by
any discussion at the Apalachin meeting, and the family
he controlled was named after him.) The second agenda
topic involved membership. Those who bought their way in
were to be ejected and the selling of memberships was to
be condemned. The next agenda item was to be the possible
formal banning of narcotics trafficking by La Cosa Nostra
members. In the fourth discussion, a plan was to be
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developed on how to deal with nonunion labor that could
threaten the jobs of members of Mob-controlled labor
unions. Finally, in an unannounced discussion, Genovese
was going anoint himself boss of bosses. (Davis 84, 85)
But things didn't go as planned. A state trooper,

Sgt. Edgar Croswell, was investigating a bad-check inci
dent at an Apalachin hotel when he noticed that Barbara's
son, Joseph Barbara Jr., had reserved three rooms under
the name "Barbara" for the nights of Nov. 13 and 14,
1957. On Nov. 13, other state troopers saw luxury cars
headed to Barbara's ranch-style home. Croswell returned

to the hotel that evening and found Cleveland boss John
Scalish's car there. curious, the trooper decided he
would visit Barbara's home on the next day. He and some
other troopers arrived around noon and found some of the
nation's most powerful and vicious mobsters standing near
a huge barbecue pit where thick steaks flown in from the
Armour Co. of Chicago were sizzling. They were going to
eat lunch and then talk. Since there was no evidence of a
crime being committed, the police could not raid the
home. But they did jot down license plate numbers.
Croswell also radioed in for two backup cars and three
deputies. over 35 cars, mainly Cadillacs and Lincolns,
were there and many of the cars had out-of-state plates.
When Mrs. Barbara saw the police through a window she
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shouted, "Hey, there's the troopers. The troopers are
here!" (Davis 87) Many of the mobsters, in their suits
and ties, suddenly scattered. Some ran to their cars.
Some fled to the barn. Some bolted for the woods and
fields. Others kept their cool and stayed in the house.
Croswell quickly got in his car and drove to Route 17
near the end of Barbara's driveway to set up a roadblock
and checkpoint. The troopers, who were located at various
areas around the estate, managed to detain, identify and
question 58 mobsters. Before the hoodlums were released,
the troopers checked their wallets and found that they
were carrying about $300,000, or about $5,172 each.

Months later, people were finding $100 bills in the area
that some mobsters discarded to avoid looking suspicious.
(O'Brien 38)
J. Edgar Hoover's Response to the Apalachin
Meeting
J. Edgar Hoover swallowed a bitter dose of reality
when he went to his front steps the following morning to
retrieve his Sunday paper. The Apalachin meeting made
national headlines. It astounded the American public by
proving the contrary to what Hoover and the mobsters

themselves had been saying for years; the meeting proved
that a national crime network existed. It was a major

25

blow to the out-of-touch FBI and a major blow to La Cosa
Nostra which would now be more carefully watched.
The Top Hoodlum Program
Within days Hoover launched the Top Hoodlum Program

in which each bureau field office in the country had to
develop a list of 10 major hoodlums in their jurisdic

tions. Some offices had so many mobsters in their terri

tory that they had difficulty deciding which ones to put

on the list, while other offices had difficulty identify
ing mobsters in their areas and ended up with the names

of people who could hardly be considered mobsters. The
FBI at that time thought it could dissolve the crime

network within six to eight months. (Ungar 394) In the

Chicago office, a group of young, restless agents who had
become bofed with paper shuffling were given the task of
developing a top-10 list. While gathering information,

they got a tip that the city's top mobsters met in the

mornings at a tailor's shop over a restaurant on North

Michigan Avenue. From a lookout in a tall building across
the street, the agents noticed a lot of traffic to and
from the shop and decided they wanted to bug (place a

surveillance microphone in) the shop. Hoover approved the
plan. In a series of "break-ins" usually in early Sunday
mornings, the agents placed a bug in a radiator in the
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shop and ran the wire down an elevator shaft and then out
of the building. The installation work was sloppy but
functional. The bug went undetected and provided a wealth
of information for five years. The agents learned, by
eavesdropping on foul-mouthed Chicago boss Sam Giancana,
which mobsters held seats on La Cosa Nostra's ruling
body, the commission. (Ungar 395) In 1964 they_ learned
how the former U.S. attorney general and former U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark was bribed into granting
parole to four Chicago mob leaders in 1947. (Gentry 335)
The transcripts revealed everything from gruesome killing
methods to corrupt Congress members. The bugging opera
tion was so successful it served as a model for similar
operations around the country.
Hoover's Continuing Denial
Before a great deal of information was obtained from
the Chicago bug, Hoover began to admit that La Cosa Nos
tra existed, but he refused to say it existed before his
admission. In the fall of 1958, the FBI's Research and
Analysis division completed, with Hoover's blessing, a
two-volume report on La Cosa Nostra. One volume discussed
La Cosa Nostra's history in Sicily and the other volume
covered its evolution in America. The study proved that
the Mob existed in America and that it existed here dur-
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ing Hoover's period of denial. Deputy FBI Director
William Sullivan headed the division and had 25 copies of
the report made. The copies were distributed throughout
the Justice Department, including one to Hoover. After
Hoover returned from lunch, he read the report, called it
"baloney" and ordered Sullivan to immediately retrieve
each copy. Sullivan's agents ran through the building
pulling copies from in-baskets. The study was never used
or read by anyone outside the FBI. (Gentry 454, 455,
Ungar 393)
The McClellan Committee
Sen. John McClellan of Arkansas also took an inter
est in organized crime and he chaired two investigating
committees, the most famous of which was set up in 1963.
In February 1957, about four months before Costello was
shot in the Majestic lobby, the U.S. Senate Committee on
Government Operations formed the Senate Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field,
more commonly called the McClellan Committee. The hear
ings lasted until 1960. The committee's purpose was to
investigate illegal labor union activities but it soon
began to focus on one union, the International Brother
hood of Teamsters, and two people who controlled the
union, President Dave Beck and Central states Committee
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Leader James Hoffa. The committee learned that many of
those who attended the Apalachin meeting were in labor
related businesses and they started to learn how powerful
La Cosa Nostra really was - all before J. Edgar Hoover
admitted that it existed. The hearings revealed evidence
that led to the convictions of Beck and other union offi
cials including, in 1962, Hoffa. (Herbert 85)
In May 1963, the committee was resurrected and
renamed the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
still commonly called the McClellan Committee. The tele
vised hearings gave Americans a crash course in La Cosa
Nostra starting on Sept. 27, 1963 when Joseph Valachi, a
soldier in the Genovese family, disclosed the inner work
ings of the Mob. Valachi had been serving a 15-year sen
tence in the U.S. Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Ga.,
for narcotics trafficking. In June 1962, he believed that
his boss, Vito Genovese, had given one of his fellow
inmates a contract on his life. Valachi decided to strike
first. He murdered the inmate. (Officials later learned
that the inmate did not have a contract to kill Valachi.)
Valachi felt his crime family had betrayed him and he
wanted to avoid a death sentence for his crime so he
decided to cooperate with law enforcers and McClellan.
(Ryan 72, Albanese 42) Valachi was the first mobster to
talk openly about La Cosa Nostra to a national audience.
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In his five-day testimony, he carefully described the
formal initiation process, the hierarchy, the history,
the job titles, the job responsibilities and pretty much
anything else investigators wanted to know. He said the
Mob had 24 families in cities throughout the country and
said the organization was called "La Casa Nostra," not
the "Mafia" as everyone was calling it. Much of the
information he gave on crimes coincided with information
that the Justice Department had. The accuracy of his tes
timony was debated for many years but Valachi put J.
Edgar Hoover into a position in which he could no longer
deny that La Cosa Nostra existed for many years. The
FBI's investigation of organized crime now became
intense.
The President's 1967 Commission
On March 8, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson launched
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice to evaluate all aspects of the
U.S. criminal justice system. The commission, which was
divided into task forces, thoroughly examined crime in
America and one task force focused on organized crime.
The commission published its reports in 1967 and became
commonly called the President's 1967 Commission. The
reports made organized crime a national concern and they
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revealed the weaknesses in law enforcement's ability to
confront organized crime. The commission's work led to
several pieces of legislation involving the investigation
of organized crime, the most important one being the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.
The Witness Protection Program
The Organized Crime Control Act revolutionized how
law enforcers battled organized crime. It provided the
Witness Protection Program which gives immunity, protec
tion and housing to certain government witnesses. The
program helps law enforcers get cooperation from infor
mers who, often for good reasons, fear for their lives to
testify. The program also attracts informers by helping
them relocate to safer places, by finding them jobs and
by giving them new identities. The program isn't neces
sarily for someone who by chance saw a crime; it is
intended for someone, such as a partner in crime, who has
first-hand experience with a defendant. (Ryan 84) Many
mobsters, especially those with Mob contracts on their
lives, have come to realize that they are safer in the
Witness Protection Program. Two informers who entered the
program, James Fratianno and Salvatore Gravano, will be

discussed shortly.

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
While the Witness Protection Program was a major
boost for prosecutors, the Organized Crime Control Act's
most important provision was the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. This is the one piece of leg
islation that has truly wreaked havoc on organized crime.
The RICO Act is designed to punish participation in an
organized crime group. It facilitates the prosecution of
organizations that influence and benefit from crimes, not
just the individuals who commit the crimes. Instead of
arresting a single criminal, law enforcers determine who
the person is working with and for, and then they arrest
the entire structure at once. This helps prosecutors con
vict the underlings who do the dirty work and the well
insulated top echelon. Before the RICO statute came
along, an incarcerated mobster could return to his job in
the Mob after his release, or someone else could take his
job while he was in prison. This did little if anything
to stop Mob activities. The RICO Act changed all that,
but not overnight. Prosecutors rarely used the statute
because they didn't realize its full potential. In August
1979, members of a think tank at the FBI office in New
York City were trying to think of new ways to tackle La
Cesa Nostra and they decided to attend a seminar by G.
Robert Blakey, a professor at Cornell University Law
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School in Ithaca, New York. Blakey and Sen. John
McClellan wrote the RICO Act and Blakey was frustrated
that it wasn't being used so he decided to explain the
statute to law enforcers in a series of seminars. The
think tank liked what it heard and returned to its office
with enthusiasm but it met resistance from supervisors
and senior managers who realized that taking the RICO
approach would require the bureau to completely restruc
ture its investigative tactics. No longer would a single
agent investigate individual cases; RICO would require
teamwork, an alteration of the Hoover Establishment. The
think tank then invited Blakey to address the resisters.
He spoke to them for several hours before winning them
over. (Diarmuid 86, 87) Thanks in part to the FBI's deci
sion to develop a new organized crime-fighting strategy,
the 1980s was a devastating decade for La Cosa Nostra.
James Fratianno and the Witness Protection
Program
The usefulness of the Witness Protection Program was
fully realized in September 1977 when James Fratianno, a
former boss of the Los Angeles family, became the highest
ranking La Cesa Nostra member to enter the program and
testify against his fellow mobsters. In August 1973,
about four years before entering the program, Fratianno
began secretly and casually meeting with FBI Special
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Agent Lowell Lawrence in hotel rooms. They met several
times and Fratianno discussed his bookmaking and loan
sharking activities, and his pet peeves. He told Lawrence
that Los Angeles family boss Dominic Brooklier's old
alias was Jimmy Regace, and that Brooklier and Las Vegas
mobster Arthur DiMaria had killed a rival thug in Los
Angeles, Neddie Herbert, in July 1949. The FBI paid
Fratianno $16,000 for the information even though it was
rather worthless.
Fratianno was in the Chicago family and living in
San Francisco when, in 1975, Brooklier was sentenced to
20 months in prison. A soldier in the family, Louis
Dragna, was then asked to fill the top spot during
Brooklier's jail term. But Dragna owned a clothing busi
ness, the Roberta Co., and thought he would be too busy
to run the family on his own so he asked Fratianno if he
would transfer to Los Angeles to co-run the family.
Fratianno accepted the job but continued to live in San
Francisco. Brooklier was released from prison on Oct. 28,
1976 and he reclaimed his role as the Los Angeles family
boss in early February 1977 by demoting Fratianno to sol
dier. The demotion all the way down to soldier so humili
ated Fratianno that he decided to distance himself from
Brooklier. Fratianno's independence infuriated Brooklier
and he soon after threatened to kill Fratianno.
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On May 16, 1977, Time magazine ran a cover story
called "THE MAFIA/Big, Bad and Booming" in which
Fratianno was named in the first paragraph. The article
described him as the Gambino and Chicago mobsters' point
man in the West. It also said he "made up to 16 hits as
the Mob's West Coast executioner." The story, which did
not mention Brooklier, startled Fratianno and it came
when he didn't want publicity. He feared the article
would further inflame the already envious Brooklier. In
August 1976, an Irish group in Cleveland tried to gain
control of the city's criminal activity from the La Cosa
Nostra family there. Daniel Greene and John Nardi, a
Cleveland Teamsters union official, led the Irish group.
Cleveland family underboss Leo Moceri disappeared on Aug.
22, 1976 and was presumed dead because his car was found
in a Holiday Inn parking lot near Akron with blood in it.
The Cleveland Mob blamed the Irish group. Fratianno was a
former member of the Cleveland family and was still well
connected to it. In late May 1977, shortly after the Time
story, Fratianno stopped in Cleveland on his way to New
York where he was going to see a friend of his, Frank
Sinatra, in concert. In Cleveland, the Mob boss there,
James Licavoli, told Fratianno that a family associate,
Pasquale Cisternino, was going to put dynamite in a car
which would be parked next to Nardi's car at the Team-
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sters office. When Nardi was going to enter his car to go
home, Cisternino would detonate the explosives with a
remote control switch. Licavoli also told Fratianno that
the murder would occur soon and that Fratianno should
leave for New York soon to avoid more attention. On May
30, 1977, Time ran another story that mentioned
Fratianno. The article said that at the (mob-controlled)
Westchester Premier Theater, Frank Sinatra and his co
host, Dean Martin, had to share audience attention with
several audience members, some of La Cosa Nostra's top
echelon including Fratianno. The story also said
Fratianno had stopped in Cleveland to visit Mob friends
en route to New York on the day a bomb tore John Nardi
apart as he started his car. Fratianno was not amused.
Shortly after, a good friend of his - Anthony
Delsanter, the Cleveland family's consigliere (counselor)
- died from a massive heart attack. At the funeral in
Cleveland, Licavoli told Fratianno that a woman they knew
who was working in the FBI's Cleveland office had access
to the names of mobsters who were serving as informants
for the FBI. Licavoli said she identified two snitches,
Tony Hughes and Curly Montana, and had two more names on
the way. After leaving the funeral, Fratianno panicked
since he thought one of the names on the way would be

his. He realized that if he was identified as a snitch,
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the Mob would almost surely kill him. Lowell Lawrence had
since retired from the FBI but Fratianno decided to call
him anyway to tell him about the Mob's connection to the
FBI in Cleveland. Lawrence was extremely grateful for the
tip. Fratianno felt if he wouldn't have called Lawrence,
the woman would have revealed his name, but now that he
did call, the Mob could find out about that too. He was a
loser either way.
A few days later, Fratianno met Assistant Special
Agent in Charge James Ahearn and Special Agent Charles

Hiner, both from the San Francisco FBI field office, in a
San Francisco hotel room. Ahearn told Fratianno that they
would need his help identifying the woman and that he
would have to return to Cleveland to get more information
from his Mob friends. Fratianno reluctantly agreed to
return. In Cleveland, on Aug. 24, 1977, Fratianno le.arned
about the upcoming murder of Daniel Greene but nothing
more about the FBI woman. (The FBI would soon learn that
the leak was Geraldine Rabinowitz, a file clerk. She and
her husband - Jeffrey, a car salesman - pled guilty to
two counts each of accepting bribes totalling $15,900.
Both were sentenced to five years in prison.)

When

Fratianno met with Ahearn again in September 1977, he

told Ahearn he believed there was a contract on his life.
On Oct. 6, 1977, Greene had just walked out of his den-
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tist's office and had entered his car when a Chevrolet
Nova in the adjacent parking spot exploded. Cisternino
built the bomb and another Cleveland family associate,
Ronald carabbia, detonated it.
Fratianno was driving around in San Francisco in his
silver Cadillac with Frank Vellotta - a professional bur
glar who owned a dry cleaning business, Select Cleaners when they noticed that a red and white Ford Thunderbird
was tailing them. Fratianno punched the gas, turned down
a side street and spun his car around to play chicken
with the Ford. At the last second the Ford veered to the
right and then disappeared down a side street. The next
morning Velotta told Fratianno that the Ford had followed
him to his business that morning. Velotta added that he
got the Ford's license plate number. Fratianno then
called his loansharking collector, Bennie Barrish, and
gave him the license plate number. Barrish was well con
nected to the San Francisco Police Department and learned
that the Ford belonged to Joey Hansen, a member of
Anthony Spilotro's crew and a known killer. Spilotro was
a Chicago family soldier who coordinated the family's
affairs in Las Vegas. Fratianno realized he was at the
end of the line and decided that somehow he was going to
avenge all the mobsters who had betrayed him. He no lon
ger trusted anyone and decided to meet with Ahearn again.
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Meanwhile, a Cleveland family associate, Raymond
Ferritto, confessed and implicated everyone who was

involved with Daniel Greene's murder, including

Fratianno. Assistant Special Agent in Charge Joseph
Griffin in Cleveland asked Ahearn to arrest Fratianno.
Ahearn decided to arrest Fratianno by trapping him in a
hotel room. When Fratianno knocked on the hotel room door
two FBI agents were waiting in the bathroom and two more
were in an adjacent room. Ahearn opened the door, let
Fratianno in, sat him down on a chair facing away from
the hiding agents, handed him the murder warrant and then
told him he was under arrest. The other agents rushed in
and handcuffed Fratianno behind his back and one agent
read him his rights. They then went to the Federal Buil
ding downtown. In Ahearn's office, Fratianno was uncuffed
and the two were back on a friendly basis. Fratianno said
he wasn't in Cleveland when Greene was killed. Ahearn
said he didn't have to build or detonate the bomb to be
charged with murder one; he only had to be part of the
conspiracy. Ahearn asked Fratianno how much detail he
could give on the Los Angeles family. Fratianno said,

"Everything you'll ever need to put the whole bunch away
for a long time." But he said he wanted immunity and
protection in return. (Demaris 36-431)
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While in the Witness Protection Program, Fratianno
testified before numerous grand juries and court trials,
which led to far more convictions than can be mentioned
here. However, a few cases are worth mentioning. In fall
1978 he helped convict six people who were accused of
violating security laws and looting the Westchester Pre
mier Theater into bankruptcy. Sentences ranged from one
to six years. Frank Velotta was accused of burning down
his dry cleaning business to collect $60,000 from his
insurance company. He was charged with mail fraud for
using the U.S. mail to collect the fraudulent insurance
payment. He was sentenced to six months in prison, two
years probation and forced to return the $60,000 to his
insurance company. In May 1979, Fratianno testified in
the case against Cleveland mobsters accused of bribing
the FBI leak. Two of them, Thomas Lanci and Anthony
Liberatore, were convicted. In Florida, a Chicago family
soldier, Marshall Caifano, was convicted of possessing
and transporting $4 million in stolen securities. He was
awaiting his sentence when Fratianno testified that
Caifano was involved with the murder of Louis Strauss, a
gambler and blackmailer. Caifano was sentenced to 20
years in prison. In San Francisco, Teamsters union offi
cial Rudy Tham was found guilty on four misdemeanor char
ges involving the misuse of union funds and 15 felony
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embezzlement counts. Tham was sentenced to six months in
prison and fined $50,000. (Demaris 432-435) Fratianno�s
June 1980 testimony in New York led to the four-count
indictment of Genovese family boss Frank Tieri. He was
one of the first Mob bosses convicted under the RICO Act.
In 1982, Cleveland family boss James Licavoli was charged
with murder, conspiracy, illegal gambling and violating
the RICO statute. He was sentenced to 17 years in prison.
(Ryan 102) The list of convictions goes on and on.
Salvatore Gravano and the Witness Protection
Program
Gambino family boss John Gotti's extraordinary abil
ity to evade convictions in several trials ended when his
underboss, Salvatore "Sammy the Bull" Gravano, testified
against him in 1992. Like Fratianno, Gravano entered the
Witness Protection Program and helped put dozens of mob
sters behind bars. Gotti was convicted of violating the
RICO Act and is serving a life sentence without parole in
a prison near Marion, Ill. Since completing his five year
sentence in 1995, Gravano has lived in seven states and
has been given a new identity. Although Gotti issued a $2
million contract on his life, Gravano chose to leave the

Witness Protection Program in 1997. (Maas 6-8)

La Casa Nostra's Decline
The FBI's attack on La Casa Nostra may have been
delayed but, thanks mainly to the RICO Act, it eventually
proved to be rather successf�l. Starting in 1979, the Mob
families in New Orleans, Los Angeles, Kansas City, Provi
dence and Boston would be severely crippled if not virtu
ally eliminated. In 1988, all 17 high-ranking members of
Philadelphia's Bruno family, including boss Nicodemo
Scarfo, each received sentences of 30 to 55 years.
La Casa Nostra's ruling body, the Commission, con
sisted of leaders from four of New York City's five fami
lies and from the Chicago family. (New York's Bonanno
family had members on the Commission until the early
1980s when the family became a shambles.) In 1985, six
members of the ruling panel were charged under the RICO
Act in what became known as the commission Case. Genovese
family boss Anthony Salerno, Lucchese family boss Anthony
Corallo and underboss Salvatore Santoro, Colombo family
boss Carmine Persico, underboss Gennaro Langella and sol
dier Ralph Scopa were each sentenced to 100 years in
prison. (O'Brien 363)
After a host of other cases and convictions through
out the country, too numerous to mention, today's La Casa
Nostra struggles. Although the Mob's decline is in many
ways the result of relentless law enforcement efforts,
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other factors must be considered also. Having so many
mobsters involved with litigation meant there was blame
within to spread. This resulted with many La Casa Nostra
members simply killing.each other, most notably Gambino
family boss Paul Castellano whose White House was bugged
by the FBI. (The bug was installed in the base of a lamp
in his kitchen.) Castellano had just been indicted in the
Commission Case but on Dec. 16, 1985, before going to
trial, he and his underboss, Thomas Bilotti, were shot to
death while walking into Sparks Steak House on Manhat
tan's east side - a gruesome event masterminded by one of
their ambitious underlings, John Gatti. Not all internal
Mob killings were based on revenge; they were often used
to eliminate a member in litigation who could potentially
squeal. While prosecutors used the legal system to get
mobsters off the streets, the mobsters themselves used a
quicker, more efficient method.
Besides the Machiavellian ruthlessness it inflicted
on society, there were other reasons for La Cosa Nostra's
rise to power and wealth. An undermining of these factors
also led to the Mob's eventual decline. The old school
Mob leaders from the 1930s and 1940s, such as Charles
"Lucky" Luciano, espoused and enforced omerta, the abso
lute code of silence. The existence of La Cosa Nostra was
to be denied by its members at all costs, and a violation
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of omerta was punishable by death. La Cesa Nostra was
"The Honorable Society" and membership demanded alle
giance above family and God. The new school of mobsters,
such as John Gatti, are more careless, independent and
rebellious. Successful traditional mobsters like Carlo
Gambino and Paul Castellano were quiet and subdued, and
they avoided attention. Gotti was the flashy, flamboyant
"Dapper Don" who craved attention, and thus attracted
attention to the Mob. Most importantly, while the old
style leaders detested drug trafficking, the new breed
thrived on it. And not only did they deal drugs, they
often used drugs, thus clouding their ability to think
and reason. In sum, many of the newer mobsters tend to
reject the values that made La Cesa Nostra successful.
Just as the Irish and Jews experienced when they
first came to America, the Italians too were shunned by
other ethnic groups and had difficulty finding jobs. Some
businesses posted signs in their front windows saying
they would not employ Italians. The newly arriving ethnic
groups who felt rejected established their own small com
munities. A Little Italy could be found in almost every
major American city. A vast majority of Italians were
honest, productive workers who contributed much to Ameri
can culture. But a few who realized they weren't being
given the opportunities they deserved decided to take the
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opportunities. If hard work was not enough to achieve the
American Dream, than an alternative method was to be
used. Those who used this alternative method, and made it
into an enormously successful enterprise, often did so
not for themselves, but for their families, their grand
children and sometimes their communities. As boss of New
York's enormously powerful Gambino family in the 1960s
and 1970s, Carlo Gambino made a fortune. In 1991, his two
sons, Joseph and Thomas, donated $2 million to the Long
Island Jewish Medical Center's Children's Hospital.
Indeed, some mobsters exceeded the American Dream. When
they walked down the street, people knelt before them.
When they entered a restaurant, they were given the best
table and special service. They lived and were treated
like royalty. But more importantly, many of them created
an environment for their families which allowed their
children to attend college, move to the suburbs and
select legitimate employment. The former boss of New
York's Bonanno family, Joseph Bonanno, wrote in his 1983
autobiography, "My oldest son had been married the previ
ous year, and, with any luck, he would become a lawyer, a
professional man. I was on top of my world." (Bonanno
186-187) Many of these parents paid their dues in the
treacherous world of La Cosa Nostra so their children
could live comfortably outside of the underworld. This
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meant that as years went on, there was less need for La
Cosa Nostra, another reason for La Cosa Nostra's decline.
These children are living the American Dream, which is
exactly what the original mobsters wanted in the first
place. So maybe La Cosa Nostra has achieved its ultimate
goal after all.
The FBI's New Challenges
Law enforcers and prosecutors have learned many
tricks on how to battle La Cosa Nostra, from using legis
lation like the RICO Act, to using modern surveillance
techniques. The FBI no longer employs only clean-cut non
minority males; it tries to employ agents who can more
easily infiltrate organized crime groups, as former Spe
cial Agent Joseph Pistone did with New York's Bonnano
family in the 1970s and 1980s. The FBI has entered a new
era in which organized crime is much different than it
was 10 and 20 years ago. The bureau faces new challenges
with the new ethnic crime groups. Law enforcers face
language and cultural barriers when investigating Chinese
and Russian organized crime groups. Chinese criminals in
America use over 12 dialects. In the 1970s and 1980s,
local, state and federal law enforcement agencies had
very few, if any, officers and agents who could speak
Russian or Chinese well enough to inflitrate or gather
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information from the crime groups. The FBI faces a new
level of sophistication with Russian organized crime.
Authorities must figure out how these complex crimes work
before they can prosecute. The bureau won't disclose its
current crime-fighting techniques for fear that such
information will end up in the wrong hands but by examin
ing Chinese and Russian crime groups in America, this
thesis will offer insight into what the FBI faces today
and help us determine which of the two crime groups poses
the greatest threat to American society.

CHAPTER III
IMMIGRATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF OTHER ETHNIC CRIME
GROUPS IN AMERICA
Introduction
A study of modern organized crime would be incom
plete without at least a brief look at recent immigration
trends. Ethnic crime groups emerging in America did not
come here alone; they generally came with a vast majority
of law-abiding immigrants with the same ethnicity. Mem
bers of an ethnic group who come to America tend to set
tle in the same community together, whether the members
are law-abiding or not. In fact, we will learn in Chapter
V that Chinese crime groups commit most of their crimes
against their fellow Chinese immigrants. The beginning of
this chapter will therefore briefly discuss immigration.
Also, to help us understand Russian and Chinese crime
groups in the context of modern organized crime, this
chapter will discuss two other important, but less
threatening, emerging ethnic crime groups, the Japanese
Yakuza and Jose Miguel Battle's Cuban Corporation.
Exploring these two groups will help us understand the
characteristics of emerging crime groups before we com
pare Russian and Chinese organized criminals.
47
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Recent Immigration Trends
In the last 20 years, America has become the home to
a vast number of people from all corners of the world.
Our culture is being enriched and diversified and our big
cities are being transformed much the same way they were
between 1901 and 1910 when almost 9 million people,
mainly Europeans, immigrated to America. Between 1981 and
1990, about 10 million people moved to America, and about
half of them did so illegally. In the 1990 census, 19.7
million foreign-born people were counted in America, more
than ever before. Today's "huddled masses" are from
Brazil, Cambodia, China, El Salvador, India, Jamaica,
Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines, Russia, Vietnam,
and many other countries. Since 1977, about 80 percent of
the immigrants have come from Latin America and Asia. In
1970, 10 percent of Americans were of African, Asian or
Hispanic descent. In 1990, the percentage jumped to about
25. About 600,000 people annually immigrate to America
and this trend is expected to continue. {Schmidt 169-170,
Kleinknecht 77)
Immigrants With Bad Intentions
Many of these immigrants have revitalized urban
neighborhoods that were dilapidated or even abandoned.
They've opened convenience stores, hair salons, restau-
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rants and other types of businesses in buildings that
were once boarded up. Some areas that used to look like
war zones are now thriving business communities. These
immigrants have injected many things, from new types of
food to new types of music, into American culture. Unfor
tunately, not all immigrants are interested in earning an
honest wage. The Jamaican posses killed over 1,400 people
between 1985 and 1988 in their attempt to control crack
cocaine markets in several urban areas. Vietnamese crime
groups roam from city to city robbing and extorting mer
chants in their stores and in their homes. They commit
their crimes and then hop on the highway to do the same
thing in another city. By the time the crime investiga
tions begin, the gangsters are already out of town.
(Kleinknecht 6-7) Those from other countries - including
Cubans, Dominicans, Haitans, Japanese, Koreans and
Ukrainians - have also imported crime groups. Many of
these groups are filling the void left by the ailing La
Cosa Nostra and are trying to satisfy America's continu
ing appetite for illegal goods and services. We will now
discuss two of these groups.
The Japanese Yakuza
Organized crime groups have a long history in Japan
and are collectively called "Boryokudan" which means
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"violent groups," or "Yakuza" which is the more common
term. starting mainly in 1992, the Yakuza has become
active in the California area, Guam, and in Hawaii where
one Yakuza group reportedly owns $150 million worth in
real estate. (Ryan 57) Japan's National Policy Agency
said Yakuza had about 81,000 members in about 3,000
groups and subgroups in 1995, and grossed over $14 bil
lion in revenue that year. (Criminal Investigative Divi
sion 18) The main crimes Yakuza commits in America
include money laundering, investing in or infiltrating
legitimate business, drug trafficking, gun smuggling and
illegal gambling. (Criminal Investigative Division 42)
The term "Yakuza" comes from a card game in which a
worthless hand consists of the cards 8, 9 and 3, pro
nounced "ya," "ku, 11 and "za. 11 When Japan's feudal system
collapsed in the 1600s, the Samurai warriors were no lon
ger needed. Their worthlessness led them to adopt the
name "Yakuza. 11 (Ryan 57) They then became violent crimi
nals who engaged in illegal gambling. They gained control
over large sections of Japan's major cities and recruited
most of their members from the ghettos. (Criminal Inves
tigative Division 18)
Japan's post-World War II social and economic chan
ges allowed the Yakuza to control the black market and
expand their criminal activities. The Yakuza penetrated
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Japan's political and business communities and members
became respected in Japanese society. Yakuza members car
ried business cards and shared office space with lawyers
and stockbrokers. (Ryan 57) They were also known for
their attraction to Cadillacs and European luxury cars.
(Abadinsky 268, 269) In 1992, the Japanese government
began cracking down on Yakuza and - on March 1, 1992 enacted the Law Concerning Prevention of Unjust Acts by
Boryokudan (Yakuza) Members. These laws, and the deglam
orization of Yakuza in Japanese society, drove many
Yakuza operations underground and overseas. (Criminal
Investigative Division 19) Since the laws were enacted,
some Yakuza groups have disbanded and some members have
left their groups.

The Yakuza, one of the world's largest criminal
confederations, has centralized authority and a highly
developed hierarchy. Japanese officials believe that
about 65 percent of Yakuza's members belong to four
groups which operate in America: the Yamaguchi-gumi, the
Sumiyoshi-kai, the Inagawa-kai, and the Toa Yaui Jigyo
Kumiai. The largest Yakuza group, the Yamaguchi-gumi, has
about 20,000 members in over 700 subgroups. It uses its

American real estate holdings to launder and invest its
illegal funds from Japan. The sumiyoshi-kai has about
7,500 members in 343 subgroups and it smuggles firearms
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and traffics drugs in the California area. The Inagawa
kai has about 6,700 members in 313 subgroups, some of
whom operate in California. This group mainly launders
money and violates firearm laws. The Toa Yaui Jigyo
Kumiai, with its 850 members in six subgroups, traffics
drugs in Hawaii with help from its associates in the
California area. (Criminal Investigative Division 19)
Yakuza members travel abroad more than members of
any other organized crime group, likely because of their
involvement in smuggling illegal goods. Most guns seized
in Japan originate from America. Intelligence sources
believe the Yakuza are increasingly arming themselves to
facilitate their crimes, and increasingly smuggling
Tokarev pistols from Russian sources. The Yakuza is also
deeply involved with drug trafficking. over 33 percent of
Yakuza's 1994 profits came from illegal drug sales. Yaku
za's drug of choice is "ice" - an easily-made, smokeable
drug similar to methamphetamine - and Yakuza members,
associates or front companies control most "ice" labs.
Japan's National Policy Agency believes the Yakuza
increasingly uses narcotics trafficking to compensate for
financial losses in other areas. (Criminal Investigative
Division 42)
The Yakuza also mixes its illicit profits from Japan
with its legitimate investments in America, which are
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usually in real estate. Identifying the source and flow
of this money from Japan to America is difficult for the
FBI since money laundering is legal in Japan. (Criminal
Investigative Division 18) The real estate they purchase
in America is often developed into golf courses, casinos
and other types of tourist attractions.
In regards to Yakuza, international law enforcers
are concerned mainly with its vast economic power, its
involvement in prostitution and its knack for bribing
public officials. The Yakuza is expanding its American
activities from Hawaii and California to Las Vegas, Port
land, Seattle, Boston, Newark and New York. The FBI fears
the Yakuza will try to extort money from legitimate busi
nesses in these areas. By developing relationships with
associates in areas throughout America, the Yakuza does
not have to be physically present to have an influence in
the area. The Yakuza also works with other groups such as
La Cosa Nostra, Chinese and Korean crime groups, and
Colombian drug traffickers. (Criminal Investigative
Division 42, 44) The FBI and Japanese authorities are
increasingly cooperating to battle the problem.
Jose Miguel Battle and His Cuban
Corporation
Lieutenant David Green was a seasoned organized
crime investigator for the Broward County Sheriff's
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Department north of Miami when, in 1984, he posed as an
Irish-American tavern owner and placed a bet with a Miami
bookmaker, Alfonso Ramos. Green, possibly one of the
nation's leading authorities on bookmaking, was amazed
when he learned that Ramos set no limits on the amount a
gambler could wager. A drug dealer from Ocala, Florida
once plunked down $250,000 on one bet. Green had trained
investigators from 35 states how to infiltrate their
local bookmaking operations. The investigators reported
back to Green what they were learning and Green ended up
with a wealth of information. Ramos was reportedly linked
to the Corporation, a Cuban-American crime empire run by
multimillionaire Jose Miguel Battle. Green said in 1993
that he considered Battle the nation's "king of illegal
gambling. You could take all of the Mob families in the
country and you won't find one as strong as this."
(Kleinknecht 250)
The Corporation is based in southern Dade County but
its tentacles reach to New York City, New Jersey, Los
Angeles, Houston and Tampa. Law enforcers and former Cor
poration members testified in the Presidents Commission
on Organized Crime hearings in 1985 and said the crime
group had about 2,500 members. The Corporation was alleg
edly linked to over 30 unsolved murders and controlled
over 700 numbers outlets and banks in New York City,
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where it annually grossed about $45 million. The numbers
game is a form of lottery in which a person bets that a
certain three-digit combination will appear in numbers
regularly published in newspapers. The media give Battle
little attention, mainly because the public considers the
numbers game a harmless crime.
Interestingly, Battle has his roots in a CIA opera
tion. When the corrupt Fulgencio Batista was Cuba's pres
ident, he was cozy with La Cosa Nostra and realized
Havana had the potential to be a major tourist attraction
for Americans. In 1953, Batista invited La Cosa Nostra's
financial wizard, Meyer Lansky, to reform gambling in
Cuba and to convert Havana into a tourist magnet with
luxury hotels and casinos. (Lacey 226) Thanks to the Mob,
tourism was on the rise and jobs became plentiful. When
Fidel Castro ousted Batista in 1959, many of those in
Cuba's underworld - including police, businessmen, gov
ernment officials and the mobsters themselves - fled to
America. The CIA recruited and trained some of these
Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro's communist
regime. Some of the soldiers who invaded Cuba, in what
was called the Bay of Pigs invasion, weren't necessarily
interested in ejecting Castro; they just wanted to return
to the cushy jobs they had when Batista was president.
But after the 1961 invasion failed, these shady soldiers
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returned to America with their knowledge of weapons and
explosives. One of these veterans was Jose Miguel Battle,
a former vice sergeant in Cuba's national police who knew
Lansky in Havana. Battle was in Brigade 2506 and was pro
moted to a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. (McGee lA,
Kleinknecht 244) Some of these veterans, including
Battle, went into organized crime in America.
Battle opened the first Cuban-controlled gambling
operation in Miami before moving in the mid 1960s to

Union City, N.J., the home of the largest Cuban-American
community outside of Southern Florida. In Union City, at
age 38, he opened a go-go bar and soon became known as El
Padrino, the Godfather. He associated with a captain in
the Bonanno crime family, Joseph Zicarelli, who allowed
Battle to run the numbers games in Union City and West
New York as long as he gave a percentage of his earnings
to La Casa Nostra. Battle ran his activities out of a
store in which jewelry and religious items were sold. By
then his operations involved nine major Hudson county and
upper Manhattan banks. (Kleinknecht 244) He expanded his
dominion by recruiting other Bay of Pigs veterans to
seize the territories of independent numbers game opera
tors. Battle's henchmen would eliminate an uncooperative
rival by attaching a hand grenade to the bottom of his
car and, with fishing line, tie the grenade's pin to a
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wheel. When the car moved and the wheel turned, the pin
would be removed from the grenade which would then
explode. Arson became a weapon of choice against uncoop
erative store owners. A few henchmen would enter the
store, dump gas on the floor, toss a lit match and run.
(Kleinknecht 245).
Battle's career almost ended in 1977. He had ordered
one of his hit men, Carlos Hernandez, to kill another one
of his hit men, Ernestico Torres, who had bungled the
kidnapping of an East Coast gambling "banker," Luis
Marrero. Torres knew he was in trouble so he fled to a
Miami suburb, Opa-Locka. Instead of killing Torres,
Hernandez went to Opa-Locka and warned Torres. When
Battle learned about the betrayal, he sent down three
other men, including Julio Acuna, to make the hit. On
June 16, 1976, the men entered Torres' apartment and,
with a silencer-equipped revolver, shot his girlfriend,
Idelia Fernandez, in the head and chest while she was
watching General Hospital on television. (Fernandez sur
vived this incident but was murdered in New York 18 days
before she was to testify against Acuna on Dec. 17,
1984.) Torres was sleeping when Acuna put a bullet right
between his eyes. Soon after, Hernandez was still fearing
Battle's vengeance when Hernandez was arrested on a weap
ons charge in Union City. He then ratted on his former
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boss. In November 1977, Battle was convicted of solicita
tion and conspiracy to murder but the Third District
Court of Appeal overturned the verdict. (Messerschmidt
2D, Kleinknecht 245, 246, McGee lA) Battle later pleaded
guilty to murder conspiracy and was sentenced to time
already served, two years.
Battle's son, Jose Miguel Battle Jr., and an asso
ciate, Abraham Rydz, became key players in the Corpora
tion which gradually shifted its base to southern Flor
ida. In 1982, Battle Jr. and Rydz invested in legitimate
South Florida businesses including El Zapotal Realty Inc.
and the Union Financial Research co. Inc., a company
formed in 1971 by Miami financier Hugo Acebo. The Battle
family and Rydz also invested $1.1 million in Dade County
real estate in 1982. Battle Jr. and Rydz bought homes on
Key Biscayne, and Battle Sr. bought a home and a ranch on
19 acres, called Rancho el Zapotal, at 17249 SW 192nd st.
in Southwest Dade. At the ranch, Battle grew fruit trees
and raised many dogs and fighting cocks.
On April

a,

1983, Battle Jr. and Rydz were preparing

to board a Miami-bound jet at the John F. Kennedy Inter
national Airport in New York when a suspicious security
guard asked to look inside their three carry-on bags.
Authorities found they were carrying $439,504 in bundles
of cash wrapped as Christmas presents. Police also found
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documents Battle Jr. had torn up and thrown into an ash
can revealing that the Corporation's New·York City gam
bling operations raked in $2.1 million in one week.
(McGee lA, Kleinknecht 236).
By August 1985, Battle Sr. controlled over 700 gam
bling outlets and banks in New York and New Jersey. An
armed caravan of cars collected the take from the outlets
each week. (McGee lA) On May 11, 1987, The South Florida
Business Journal ran a story listing South Florida's 50
wealthiest people and families. With an estimated worth
of $175 million, Battle was in the 28th position. He tied
with Generoso Pope Jr., who owns The National Enquirer,
The Weekly World News, and Video Digest. (Fogarty 24, 25)
In the text that accompanied the list, Battle was
described as follows:
Lives in Miami and New York, age 58. A former Havana
vice cop, he reportedly is chairman of nationwide
Cuban organized crime group involved in gambling.
Known as El Padrino, he spends most of his time at
heavily guarded ranch in South Dade. Gambling take
reported nets $50 million a year. Estimated worth,
by undercover agents, $175 million. (Fogarty 18)
Battle - who sometimes stayed at an estate in Lima,
Peru - has hundreds of video poker machines in stores,
bars and other businesses in South Florida's Hispanic
communities. The Corporation has one of the nation's
best-financed sports betting rings. It hides its earnings
in Swiss banks, money laundering schemes and legitimate
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businesses in Florida and New Jersey. Battle was known
for laundering his money by buying thousands of lottery
tickets in Puerto Rico and selling them in America. He
would use his illicit proceeds to pay the winner the
amount that the winner had coming. Battle would then cash
in the winning ticket and collect the prize money from
Puerto Rico. (Kleinknecht 250, McGee lA)
In January 1990, Metro-Dade police officers listened
to wiretapped telephone conversations for 12 days and
learned that Battle's men were illegally wagering on pro
and college football and basketball games. One bookmaker
accepted over $175,000 a week in wagers and another book
maker accepted over $160,000 over the 12-day period. The
bookmaking operation allegedly continued until February
1994. (Epstein 2B)
The organization expanded in Florida and New York,
most notably into sections of Harlem that the Genovese
and Lucchese crime families used to control. Some law
enforcers in New York believe Battle became so powerful
in the city that he no longer had to give a percentage of
his income to La Cesa Nostra. The Corporation told a Har
lem candy store owner, Jose Salazar, to stop selling num
bers but he refused because he was having difficulty pay
ing his rent. In early May 1993, two men entered the
store with gasoline and torched the place, seriously
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burning Salazar's wife, Leny. On May 3, 1993, the New
York Daily News ran a story on the arson and a profile on
Battle. Fearing attention, Battle moved to Peru.
(Kleinknecht 252)

On June 24, 1994, about 120 federal, state, and
local law enforcers searched 21 homes and businesses
throughout Dade County believed to be linked to Battle.
Authorities - who seized over $350,000 in cash, several

guns, ledgers and other items - said the businesses were
used to launder Battle's gambling proceeds. He was still
in Peru and his Dade home was not searched. On Jan. 5,

1995, state prosecutors charged 12 of Battle's men with
running a sports bookmaking operation that raked in hun
dreds of thousands of dollars a week. (Epstein 2B)

Battle, a non-u.s. citizen, returned to America
before Dec. 18, 1996, when federal agents smashed through
the iron gate at his estate with a truck to raid his home
and arrest him. Battle wasn't home so the agents and the
Metro-Dade SWAT team waited for him to arrive. When he
did, authorities arrested him for affixing his picture to
two altered u.s. passports that belonged to Alfredo
Walled and Franklin Pena. Battle presented the passports
as his own while in Peru and on the south Caribbean

island of Curacao in 1995. (Robles lB [Dec. 19, 1996])
The crime may seem trivial but it was a crime they could
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directly pin on Battle, in much the same way Al Capone
was convicted of income tax evasion.
Also while in Peru, Battle was separated from his
wife and remarried Evelyn Runciman twice, once under a
name from an altered passport and once under his real
name. When they moved to Miami, she married Battle's
nephew without divorcing Battle. Runciman was also
arrested for altering a passport but was released on
$50,000 bond. Battle was 67 when he was arrested and
Runciman was 21. Authorities who raided Battle's home
confiscated $92,800, ledgers recording a gambling busi
ness and three weapons. (Robles 4B [Dec. 20, 1996])
On March 13, 1997, Battle pleaded guilty to altering
passports. (Herald Staff 2B) Under the sentencing guide
lines of his passport fraud plea, he would serve up to a
year. In May 1997, he was charged with possession of a
Mossberg 20-gauge �hotgun which was found in his bedroom
closet during the raid. Battle, a felon, was not allowed
to have weapons. At 68, Battle has serious health prob
lems too. He has diabetes, hypertension and end-stage
kidney failure, and undergoes dialysis treatments every
Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Battle is housed in Ward D
of the Jackson Memorial Hospital where he is awaiting a
kidney transplant. (Davies lA [Aug. 17, 1997]) On Oct. 7,
1997, Battle was found guilty of illegal gun possession
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and now faces up to six years in prison for that convic
tion. As of Oct. 8, 1997, U.S. Senior District Judge
James King was expected to hand down his sentence on the
passport conviction within a few weeks and as of this
writing (Nov. 18, 1997), U.S. District Judge Alan Gold
scheduled sentencing on the gun conviction for Dec. 18,
1997. (Davies lB [Oct. 8, 1997]) Authorities believe
Battle Jr. will take over as the Corporation's boss.
(McGee lA)

The Japanese Yakuza and the Cuban Corporation in
Perspective
As we will more fully realize when we reach Chapter
VI, there are significant differences between the Yakuza,
the Corporation and the Russian and Chinese groups. The
Corporation's main crimes, which involve the numbers game
and video poker machines, are lucrative but arguably
cause less harm than what other groups do. The Corpora
tion in general affects only people involved with these
games, and not the average American. Also, the activities
of Battle's group are somewhat regional, mainly the South
Florida/New York areas. The Yakuza is sophisticated and
operates at the international level but in America, oper
ations are mainly on the West Coast. The Japanese group's
crimes are serious and increasingly diverse, but its
ability to affect the average American is, for now at
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least, somewhat limited. As we will learn, the Russian
group is very sophisticated and able to affect many peo
ple. The Chinese group's crimes, such as narcotics traf
ficking, are very serious and often involve extreme vio
lence. Now that we better understand the world of modern
organized crime, we can explore the two main emerging
groups which operate in it.

CHAPTER IV
RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

Introduction
Since the emergence of Russian organized crime
groups in America is a rather recent phenomena, the study
of these groups here is still in its infancy. This chap
ter's sources include the FBI, academics, journalists,
and an analysis compiled by the New York State Organized
Crime Task Force, the New York State Commission of Inves
tigation, the New Jersey State Commission of Investiga
tion, and the Pennsylvania Crime Commission. In compari
son to other ethnic crime groups in America, Russian
organized criminals are unique in that many of them were
previous members of the political elite in Russia, or the
former Soviet Union. Other ethnic crime groups generally
operate independently of a government but in Russia,
organized criminals and government officials were often
one and the same. Since the role of organized crime in
Russia is relevant to this study, the chapter will begin
by briefly discussing this role. We will then explore the
spread of Russian organized crime to America and each
aspect of how these criminals operate here.
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Organized Crime in Russia
Although Russian organized crime has become a major
problem in America.only since the late 1980s, it has been
plaguing its native country considerably longer. Reports
of organized crime in Russia became more common in the
late 1980s during the early stages of glasnost (openness)
there. In its coverage of the problem, the Western press
described the types of organized crime and how they
became a major concern for Russian law enforcers. The
4,000 to 5,000 criminal groups operating in the Soviet
Union flourished due to corruption in the state apparatus
and the Communist Party. (Finckenauer 249) Russia has

three levels of organized crime groups. The elite type,

called "thieves in authority," consists mainly of former
top government bureaucrats and communist Party officials.

The professional type, called vory v zakone (thieves in

law) resembles America's La Cesa Nostra. The lower, less
sophisticated type emerged onto the crime scene after the
Soviet Union's collapse and its members are generally now
in their late teens to mid 30s.
The elite organized criminals illegally trafficked

legal goods and services which were scarce due to the

Soviet Union's inefficient, centralized economic system.
The scarcity of these goods and services led to a high
demand for them. The members of this group abused their
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high-level positions to commit their sophisticated form
of white-collar crime. Many of them have a good educa
tion and international connections. They also have enough
knowledge and experience to commit international banking
schemes and to traffic black market nuclear materials. Of
the three crime group types, the thieves in authority
have the potential to wreak the most havoc in Russia and
America. (Tri-State 29)
The professional criminals, or thieves-in-law, oper
ate in many cities throughout the Commonwealth of Inde
pendent States. This group resembles America's La Cosa

Nostra in terms of internal discipline, bonding rituals,
the hiring of killers, international links, rules and
codes of behavior, and their own lingo. (Finckenauer 249,
250, Tri-State 27) Also, just like La Cosa Nostra, a
prospective member needs the recommendation by a current
member to join, and the initiation ceremony is usually
elaborate. (Kleinknecht 283) They traffic luxury goods
and narcotics, and they work with Russian organized
criminals in America. Many members of this group are
hard-core criminals and ex-cons (specifically from the
Gulag prison system set up by Stalin in the 1930s). (Tri
state 26)

Russia's lower-level criminal groups engage in burg
lary, murder, pornography, prostitution, extortion and
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black marketing. They also traffic drugs, weapons and
stolen cars. (Finckenauer 250) Some of these criminals
are college graduates or former military personnel who
believe, due to Russia's struggling economy, that decent,
legitimate jobs are scarce and that crime can pay their
bills. Members in this group tend to be less hard-core
than those in the other two groups. (Tri-State 28)
The Spread of Russian Organized Crime
to America
Many of these criminals nearly perfected the art of
organized crime in Russia in part by having to constantly
evade the Soviet Union's feared secret police and intel
ligence agency, the KGB. Also, due to the Soviet Union's
endless amount of bureaucratic paperwork, these mobsters
mastered the processes of forgery and counterfeiting.
(Kleinknecht 272) When they came to America, they quickly
and easily adapted their skills to the considerably
freer, less bureaucratic American society. In the early
and mid 1970s, the KGB carefully collected many free and
imprisoned hard-core criminals and dumped them in America
and Western Europe. These criminals were to penetrate and
destabilize legitimate immigrant communities abroad and
Western societies in general. Also, profits from Russian
organized crime in the West funded clandestine KGB opera
tions here. After he served 10 years in labor camps for

69
rape and burglary, the KGB sent Nikolai Ogorodnikov and
his wife, Svetlana, to America. In 1985, the couple was
arrested for passing classified FBI files from FBI agent/
mole Richard Miller to the KGB. In a U.S. federal court,
Nikolai was sentenced to eight years in prison, Svetlana
was sentenced to 18, and Miller received 20. (Adams 34,
35, Friedman 28)
Many Russians moved to America after 1988 when the
Soviet Union eased its immigration restrictions, most
notably to Brighton Beach in southern Brooklyn, New York.
This area, just east of Coney Island, has America's larg
est Russian immigrant community. About 61,000 Russians
came to America in just 1991. About 350,000 Russians were
living in America in 1996 but obtaining exact counts can
be difficult since many Russians came illegally or have
overstayed their tourist visas. The number of visas
issued to Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians jumped
from about 3,000 in 1988 to about 129,500 in 1992. About
15 percent of these people stayed in America after their
visas expired. Federal agents and the New York City
Police Department believe about 500 Russian organized
criminals are in New York alone. Most Russian criminals
in America are here legally even though many of them have
criminal records in Russia. (Finckenauer 252, 253, 257,
262, Kleinknecht 283, Tri-state 6, 8)
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Besides New York, Russian organized crime groups
have been identified in Boston, Cleveland, Denver, Hous
ton, Los Angeles, Miami, Philadelphia, Sacramento, San
Diego and San Francisco. FBI field offices in 25 other
U.S. cities have investigated Russian organized crime
groups. (Freeh maps) These groups, which operate in a
type of confederacy called the Organizatsiya (Organiza
tion), are active mainly in the New York/New Jersey/
Pennsylvania area where the Russian immigrant population
is greatest. A Rutgers University research team mailed
questionnaires to 750 federal, state, county and local
law enforcement agencies nationwide to determine the
extent of Russian organized crime in America. Of the 484
respondents, 167 said that from 1991 to 1995 they con
tacted, investigated or prosecuted criminals or suspected
criminals from the former Soviet Union. Forty-seven agen
cies said they had dealt with over 20 Russian criminals,
and 65 agencies considered Russian organized crime a
major problem in their jurisdictions. (Tri-State 47)
Russian crime groups can be ruthless, disloyal and
greedy and they have less structure and secrecy than La
Cosa Nostra. With many members being educated profession
als, they are perhaps America's most intelligent, sophis
ticated crime group. (Finckenauer 257) Unlike other eth
nic crime groups of the past and present, the Russian
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groups didn't start as street gangs. They came to America
with the skills that allowed them to commit sophisticated
crimes almost immediately after arriving. They engage in
extortion, forgery, counterfeiting, confidence schemes,
narcotics trafficking, murder, prostitution, tax and

insurance fraud, jewelry and gold coin switches, theft,
arson, and the infiltration of legitimate business. Most
of their crimes involve some type of deception.
Their earliest victims included major credit card
companies, banks and the Internal Revenue Service. With
complex shoplifting and burglary rings, they stole mil
lions of dollars in merchandise from major department
stores. (Kleinknecht 277) One early Russian crime group

became known as the Potato Bag Gang because its members

would trick Russian immigrants into buying sacks of pota
toes at inflated costs by claiming that the sacks were
full of antique gold rubles. (Finckenauer 258, 259,
Kleinknecht 277, 278) Like many ethnic crime groups, the
Russian criminals prey on innocent members of their own
ethnic community. But unlike most other ethnic criminal
groups, the Russian criminals were quick to victimize the
community at large. (Kleinknecht 278)

Law enforcers believe Russian crime groups work with
other ethnic crime groups including La Cosa Nostra and
the Colombian cartels. This cooperation will be discussed
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throughout the chapter. The next six sections will dis
cuss the different types of crimes Russian mobsters in
America commit, including crimes of deception and fraud,
nuclear weapons/materials smuggling, auto theft, narcot
ics trafficking, violent crimes and money laundering.
Crimes of Deception and Fraud
This section will reveal that Russian mobsters are
masters of deception. The fuel tax fraud is probably the
most lucrative and well known crime they've committed but
they do engage in other types of scams, such as those
involving medical insurance, telecommunications in
California, credit cards and counterfeiting.
With the fuel scam, the Russian mobsters would run
wholesale fuel companies that annually evaded paying up
to $5 billion in state and federal excise tax. Under fed
eral law, fuel wholesalers had to collect taxes on their
sales and then give the tax to the IRS. The scheme
involved No. 2 oil which can be used as taxable diesel
fuel or nontaxable home-heating oil. The Russian crimi
nals would pose as owners of home-heating oil companies
when buying No. 2 oil. With confusing paper trails, they
would pass the oil through a string of bogus companies
and sell it as diesel fuel. The mobsters kept the taxes
they collected from their customers. This can really add
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up in a state like New Jersey where the total tax due on
a gallon of diesel fuel is 41.9 cents. After learning
about the scam, the IRS and law enforcers would realize
that the companies had been dissolved and that the names
of the companies' owners were phony. (Kleinknecht 273, ·
Finckenauer 261, Tri-State 12)
Each of these companies was basically a mail drop, a
telephone and an answering machine. The owners frequently
changed the companies' names, used couriers for collect
ing cash and opened bank accounts under phony names.
These companies were called "daisy chains." New Jersey
and New York State are especially vulnerable to this type
of fraud since they have many refineries and fuel dis
tributors. (Finckenauer 262)
Lawrence Iorizzo owned a Long Island fuel company
and claimed he started the fuel scam. In 1981, La Cosa
Nostra members tried to muscle in on his scheme so he
went to Colombo family underboss Michael Franzese for
help. Franzese became a partner and protected the company
from other La Cosa Nostra members. (Tri-State 13) The
pair worked with Russian mobsters. In 1984, a federal
task force on Long Island busted the scheme and Iorizzo
was indicted for stealing $1.1 million in fuel taxes. He
joined the Witness Protection Program and testified
before the oversight subcommittee of the House Ways and
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Means Committee that a former partner of his, Martin
Carey, skimmed tax money from Iorizzo's company. Iorizzo
said Carey used the money to help fund the campaign of
his brother, New York Governor Hugh Carey. In 1987, when
Mario Cuomo was governor, the counsel to New York's Crime
and Correction Committee, Jeremiah McKenna, called for a
hearing to investigate Iorizzo's charges. Cuomo, who ran
as Carey's running mate as lieutenant governor in 1978,
then forced McKenna to resign, saying McKenna was spread
ing false and malicious stories. Iorizzo's charges were
never investigated. (Friedman 38) Iorizzo later left the
Witness Protection Program. (Sterling 163) Unfortunately,
Russian mobsters kept the scheme going.

Besides cheating the government out of taxes, this

scam can also force honest, tax-paying wholesalers out of
business. The bogus wholesalers sell the fuel at a lower
cost than the legitimate wholesalers can afford to sell
their fuel at, thus driving many honest companies out of
business. (Tri-state 13)

Leo Liebowitz was the chief executive officer of a
legitimate, mid-size gas station chain called Power Test.
Liebowitz realized he could no longer compete with other
stations who were selling cheap gas bought from Russian
mobsters so he decided to join the scheme. He told his
company counselor, Robert Eisenberg, and one of his dis-
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trict sales managers, John Byrne, to buy gas from the
mobsters. Byrne, Eisenberg and a top Russian criminal,
Marat Balagula, started their own daisy chain that sold
gas exclusively to Power Test. Power Test made so much
money that it managed to buy the Getty Petroleum Corp.
from Texaco Inc. in 1985. Liebowitz dropped the name
"Power Test" and adopted the "Getty" name for his $1.3
billion company. Forbes magazine called Liebowitz one of
America's most brilliant businessmen. (Friedman 36) Even
with Iorizzo out of the picture, agents of the federal
Organized Crime strike Force in Brooklyn in 1985 esti
mated that the mobsters controlled or supplied a third of
the New York City area's fuel dealerships. (Adams 36)
By 1986, Balagula was king of all fuel scams in
America. He and his Russian underlings controlled seven
terminals, a fleet of trucks and over 100 gas stations.
And La Cosa Nostra wanted a piece of the action. After
Franzese, Colombo family member Frank Sciortino and a
Gambino soldier extorted over $500,000 from the Russians,
Balagula forged an alliance with the Genovese and
Lucchese families. (Friedman 38) La Cosa Nostra eventu
ally controlled all of the New York area's daisy chains.
(Tri-State 13) The Russians paid two cents per gallon to
the bosses of four of New York City's five La Cosa Nostra
families, which amounted to an estimated $42 million a
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year. (Friedman 36) Cops corrupted by La Cosa Nostra pro
tected the Russians. (Sterling 162) The scam gradually
spread from the New York/New Jersey area to Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Georgia, Florida, Texas and California. (Tri-State
13) In 1986, at the height of his power, Balagula was
convicted for his involvement in a debit-card fraud.
(Friedman 40)
In 1991, Getty Petroleum was accused of selling
daisy chain fuel and fined $400,000. Byrne and Eisenberg
became government witnesses and escaped prosecution.
Liebowitz was never indicted but another Getty executive
was convicted. (Friedman 36) Again, the Russian mobsters
continued the scheme.

A Gambino family captain, Anthony Morelli, and sev

eral Russian mobsters created a fuel tax scheme that net
ted about $100 million. In May 1991, the FBI and the IRS
set up a phony fuel company in Ewing Township, New Jer
sey, which would compete with Russian mobsters' compa

nies. A Gambino family associate, Edward Dougherty, soon
after approached the undercover agents and told them they
would have to pay a tax to the Mob. The investigation,
code named Operation Red Daisy, led to the convictions of
12 people, including six Russians in 1993. (Kleinknecht
274)
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Also in 1993, a federal grand jury in Pennsylvania
indicted 15 people and two businesses involved in a $15
million scam. In New York, 18 people, including five
Russians, were charged in connection with a $34 million
scheme. In 1995 in New Jersey, 25 people, including 15
Russians, were charged with involvement in a $140 million
scam. (Tri-State 14)
Several measures have been developed to battle the
problem. Under a law that the New Jersey legislature
passed on July 1, 1992, wholesalers must pay taxes when
they draw the fuel from the terminal instead of after
they sell the fuel. Also, No. 2 oil to be used as home
heating oil must be dyed red. Law enforcers who find
clear oil in a home-heating oil truck can assume that the
oil and the truck belong to a tax-evading company. The
Federal Highway Trust Fund, the recipient of fuel excise
taxes, predicted in 1994 that the new laws would lead to
a $1.3 billion jump in revenues for 1995. That is money
that would otherwise go mainly to Russian criminals.
However, these clever mobsters devised another fuel
tax scheme. They buy gasoline and diesel fuel in New Jer
sey and then sell it in New York where taxes are higher.
The criminals pocket the difference between what they pay
in New Jersey and what they receive from their customers
in New York. In other words, they don't pay the extra tax
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money to New York State, an amount estimated to be $1
million per week. In one case of this type of crime, New
York state lost an.estimated $20 million in tax over an
18-month period. (Seidel 1, 2)
Another crime of deception Russians committed
involved insurance fraud. In the mid to late 1980s, a
Russian group in Los Angeles committed one of the largest
medical insurance frauds in U.S. history. The group, led
by former Soviet scientist Michael Smushkevich, set up
about 350 bogus medical clinics and mobile labs and
offered patients free physical exams and diagnostic
tests. The group also employed doctors, technicians,
clerks and administrators. The group submitted phony,
inflated bills totalling over $1 billion to insurance
companies claiming that the group had rendered medical
services prescribed by doctors. The criminals charged
health insurers an average of about $8,000 per patient.
Rejected claims were often resubmitted under a different
clinic name. The scam spread to Missouri, Illinois and
Florida. The illicit proceeds were laundered through
about 500 shell companies, many of which they set up, and
foreign banks. The mobsters drove Rolls-Royces and
Lincolns, and threw lavish parties at Hollywood restau
rants. The group illegally obtained between $50 million
and $80 million from California insurance companies
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before federal, state and local agencies busted the
scheme in 1991. (Elliott 34, Tri-State 14) Smushkevich,
his wife, his brother, David, and 10 others were
indicted. David Smushkevich testified against his brother
and received probation. On Sept. 20, 1994, Michael
Smushkevich was sentenced to 21 years in prison for
fraud, conspiracy, racketeering and money laundering. He
was also ordered to pay over $41 million in restitution,
$2.75 million in fines, and forfeit $50 million in
assets.
Insurance companies have been victimized in other
ways as well. In the early 1990s, a Russian group in
Pennsylvania faked auto accidents and submitted over $1
million in bogus claims to insurance companies. Victor
Tsan - who owned a medical clinic in Bucks County, Pa. and Alexander Zaverukha ran the scam. They staged eight
accidents and brought the "injured" participants to the
clinic to be treated for non-existent injuries. A federal
grand jury indicted Tsan, Zaverukhan, a doctor who worked
at the clinic, and six others in 1995.
Russian groups have also targeted Medicare and Med
icaid by submitting bills to these programs for services
or merchandise never rendered, including medical exams,
ambulance rides and medical equipment. In 1986, 13 Rus
sian criminals sold cheap shoes to Medicare recipients
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and then billed Medicare for expensive orthopedic shoes,
netting the criminals thousands of dollars. (Tri-State
15)

A Russian crime group posing as representatives of
Volvo International who were interested in promoting
luggage conned a luggage distributor in Suffolk County,
N.Y., out of tens of thousands of dollars in luggage.
(Kleinknecht 278)
Many Russian groups operate internationally. With
one scheme, representatives of governments or private
companies in the former Soviet Union agree to buy mil
lions of dollars worth in goods or technology from com
panies in America run by Russian criminals. The criminals
require down payments before sending the goods. The
fraudulent companies in America receive the payments and
then disappear before sending the goods to the buyers.
(Tri-State 16) In January 1992, four Russian mobsters Lev Breskin and Alexander Korogodsky of New Jersey, and
Yakov Portnov and George Yosifian of New York City started a bogus company in Manhattan before going to a
trade expo in Russia where they met customers who wanted
computers, medicine, coffee and other products difficult
to get in Russia. The interested parties included 24 Rus
sian businesses and a charity for victims of the 1986
Chernobyl accident. The mobsters requested payments in
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advance before delivery. They received $5.7 million but
never delivered the goods, and in a March 1996 federal
indictment they were charged with conspiracy, wire fraud
and money laundering. (Tri-State 17, Freeh 19)
Russian and Armenian mobsters in the Los Angeles
area developed a telecommunications scam that involves
duplicating cellular telephones. The criminals steal
electronic serial numbers from legitimate customers' cel
lular phones and program the numbers into computer chips,
thus duplicating the phones. The problem is growing rap
idly and spreading to Northern California. One Hollywood
area cellular station was losing $2 million a month from
this scam.

Russian criminals illegally copy other items as
well. Many of them have mastered the art of counterfeit
ing credit cards, checks, passports and visas. The mob
sters often market these phony items to members of their
Russian community and other Russian mobsters. The Tri
state Joint Soviet-emigre Organized Crime Project deter
mined that

the counterfeiters first obtain account information
from legitimate credit cards by stealing legitimate
cards, obtaining credit card receipts from dishonest
vendors, or copying account numbers while peeking
over the shoulder of unsuspecting credit card
users. (Tri-state 17)
The criminals then encode the legitimate account
information onto another card's magnetic strip. This
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other card may be stolen, over its credit limit, or ille
gally made by the criminals. They then use the card to
buy items from unsuspecting retailers or crooked retail
ers who are in on the scam. The goods are charged to the
legitimate credit card holder's account. This can happen
even if the account number on the magnetic strip does not
match the account number on the card since cashiers
rarely match the card's number with the number that the
card's issuing bank transmits to the retailer. One group
of Russian mobsters sold bogus, low-quality Visa cards to
other Russian immigrants in Brighton Beach. Each of the
cards had a hawk in the hologram instead of a dove and
each card had misspellings on the back side. The crimi
nals were successful until the U.S. Secret Service
arrested them in 1992. Members of another group that used
bogus cards to buy over $120,000 worth of items in Cali
fornia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylva
nia were caught in 1993. (Tri-State 18, 19)
A ring of five Russian mobsters counterfeited about
$17 million worth of U.S. currency and about $4 million
worth of traveler's checks, and circulated them in Chi
cago, Los Angeles, New York and Poland. Four of the crim
inals were charged in August 1989 and later convicted,
and the fifth mobster, Roman Kolompar, became a fugitive.
(Tri-state 18) The U.S. Secret Service, the New Jersey
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State Police and other law enforcement agencies have
caught Russian mobsters using, or trying to use, bogus
currency and traveler's checks to get cash and/or playing
chips at casinos in Atlantic City, N.J. (Tri-State 22)
Nuclear Weapons/Materials smuggling
One of the FBI's main concerns involving Russian
organized crime at the domestic and international levels
is the smuggling of nuclear weapons/materials to terror
ists or rogue nations. These weapons could be targeted to
U.S. soil or to areas abroad where Americans visit or
work. Since Russia can't afford to keep track of all of
its military hardware and corruption has run amok, Rus
sian criminals are finding ways to tap into the mighty
arsenal and either keep weapons for themselves or sell
them to eager Middle East customers, including Iran,
Iraq, Libya and Syria. AKM assault rifles, mortars,
rocket-propelled grenades and shoulder-launched anti-air
craft missiles are ending up in the hands of criminals
and international arms brokers but the main concern
involves the accessibility of 30,000 nuclear warheads
stockpiled throughout four independent republics. Tacti
cal nuclear warheads and artillery shells weighing under
100 pounds are easily transported. (A warhead is the sec
tion of a missile containing the explosive, chemical, or
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incendiary charge.) Iranian arms buyers frequently visit
Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic with about 2,000
nuclear warheads. The British press reported on Jan. 24,
1992 that Iran bought three nuclear weapons from Kazakh
stan for an estimated cost of at least $5 million each.
(Adams 38, 39)
Law enforcers also worry about the smuggling of
materials used to make nuclear weapons. The theft and
spread of radioactive materials has become a problem
throughout Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Significant
amounts of cesium in Lithuania and uranium in the Czech

Republic have been seized. About 45 tons of radioactive
zirconium metal headed for America were intercepted in
Cyprus. Also, the Canadian Customs Service seized in
Canada radioactive isotopes en route from Russia to Amer
ica. (Freeh 4, 5) A French TV crew caught on film a Rus
sian mobster and a lawyer from a Western company negoti
ating the transfer of a kilogram of weapons-grade uranium
for $500,000. In another case, a Russian mob boss and a
plain clothed Russian army officer met with Iraqi agents
in Fribourg, Switzerland, to sell four kilos of uranium
for a total of $3.5 million. At least one canister of the
uranium reached a temporary storage site en route to
Iraq. (Adams 39)

Auto Theft
Authorities in Northern California believe Russian
mobsters may be shipping stolen vehicles abroad for an
auto theft group which operates in Northern California,
Oregon and Washington. The group's younger members steal
vehicles which are then stripped. The chassis are left
where law enforcers can find them, and then they are
taken to salvage yards where the auto thieves buy them.
The group's older members run body shops where stolen
auto parts are used to rebuild the vehicles. The thieves
also buy vehicles at salvage yards for their vehicle
identification numbers, which are switched to stolen
vehicles. The rebuilt vehicles are then taken out of
state where they are reregistered to hide or clear the
salvaged title. Russian criminals allegedly ship many of
these vehicles to Europe and Russia through Seattle, Oak
land and other port cities.
Narcotics Trafficking
The FBI and the Drug Enforcement Agency believe that
Colombian cocaine on its way to Western Europe frequently
passes through the Commonwealth of Independent States.
But in America, Russian criminals are not extensively
involved with narcotics distribution. This section will
briefly discuss eight cases that involve Russian crimi-
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nals. Some of the cases will illustrate a growing trend
law enforcers are closely monitoring: the cooperation
between Russian crime groups and other ethnic crime
groups, such as the Colombian cartels and La Cesa Nostra.
The FBI is concerned about narcotics being smuggled
into America and with narcotics being smuggled over other
countries' borders. America, criminals in America, and
associates of criminals in America are often entangled in
trafficking that occurs abroad. Relaxed borders in the

Commonwealth of Independent States and improved telecom
munications systems have led to an emergence of narcotics

trafficking in, or through, the former Soviet Union.
Major drug traffickers, such as the Colombian cartels,
are always seeking new markets, many of which are in
Europe and the former soviet Union. The cartels have
learned that Eastern Europe and the former soviet Union
are prime transshipment routes to Western Europe.
(Elliott 33) Russian mobsters import heroin from South
east Asia and from poppy fields near Chernobyl, where the
poppies are large and radioactive. (Friedman 26, 27)

In the early 1990s, Russian criminals from New York

and Los Angeles were trying to open a narcotics distribu

tion route from Florida to Detroit and New York. The

criminals were working with Costa Rican drug traffickers
and were arrested in st. Augustine, Fla., for conspiracy
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and intent to import 800 kilograms of cocaine. U.S.
authorities later learned that the Russians and the
Sicilian Mafia were planning to transport a large
quantity of cocaine from Colombia to Italy.
In April 1992, the Drug Enforcement Administration
busted a 13-member heroin smuggling ring in New York,
including nine mobsters working out of Brighton Beach.
The drugs came from Southeast Asia, passed through Warsaw
and were sold to La Casa Nostra distributors. (Adams 38)
The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York prosecuted 16 people charged with distributing
heroin and cocaine in 1992. Two of the defendants, David
Podlog and Alexander Moysif, were Russian.
A joint venture between Russian criminals, a Colom
bian cartel and an Israeli group became apparent in Feb
ruary 1993 when Russian law enforcers in st. Petersburg
intercepted 1.1 tons of cocaine packed in cans labeled as
corned beef. The cocaine passed through Finland before it
was seized. (Elliott 33, Tri-State 21)
Also in 1993, 24 people led by four Russians were
charged with making crack cocaine vials in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. Law enforcers seized over $1 million in
cash, several vehicles, stock portfolios and other prop
erty during the arrest.
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Some Russian criminals in America are cozy with the
cocaine-smuggling Colombian cartels. One of them,
Vladimir Beigelman of Brooklyn, worked with the Cali car
tel. Two Hispanics fatally shot him in the face while he
was exiting a van in Queens on Dec. 2, 1993, allegedly
for his involvement with a large amount of missing
cocaine.
Five Russian mobsters - Boris Nayfeld, Shalva
Ukleba, Alexander Mikhailov, Simon Elishakov and Valery
Krutiy - were charged in 1994 with smuggling, distribut
ing and selling heroin which came from Southeast Asia,
through Poland and into America. (Tri-State 21, 22)
Tracey Hill, an alleged courier for a Russian crime
group, was arrested in February 1995 in Redding, Calif.,
on her way from the Los Angeles area to Vancouver, Brit
ish Colombia, for possession of 18 kilograms of cocaine.
Violent Crimes
Just like La Cosa Nostra, the Organizatsiya uses
violence as a means of internal discipline, as a way to
settle disputes, as a way to enforce agreements, and as a
way to further its criminal pursuits. Russian criminals
kill their own, and witnesses are either hard to find or
often refuse to cooperate with authorities. For these and
other reasons, the circumstances surrounding murders that
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involve Russian mobsters often resemble the circumstances
involving La Cosa Nostra murders. However, most attacks
by Russians are thought to be motivated by greed or ven
detta, and not committed to protect criminal interests.
Some Russian criminals work as free-lance extortionists,
and most extortions are opportunistic and not committed
to obtain power or control. Victims are often carefully
chosen and bystanders are rarely, if ever, hit.
Between Jan. 1, 1981 and April 20, 1995, there were
over 69 murders or attempted murders involving Russian
immigrants who were related to the tri-state area. A list
of 69 incidents compiled by the Tri-State Joint Soviet
Emigre Organized Crime Project reveals each victim, per
petrator or both were involved in crime but not necessar
ily criminals. For example, some of the victims could
have been innocent businessmen who refused to cooperate
with Russian extortionists. Many of the victims knew,
through a criminal relationship, the attacker or the per
son who ordered the attack. Out of the 69 victims, 58
died by or were hit by gunfire, five were either stabbed
or bludgeoned to death, one, Boris Nayfeld, had an unex
ploded bomb found under his car, and another, Simeon
Raichel, was severely beaten but survived. With four vic
tims, the killing methods were not listed but one of
them, Philip Moskowitz, was tortured before his death.
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Hit men, possibly hired, sometimes committed the attacks,
many of which were well planned. The attackers often dis
tracted or tricked. their victims before attacking them.
Victims were often shot from moving vehicles or at close
range in the head or chest. (Tri-state 19, 32-33, 53-63)
In one case not included in the list, a gangster stabbed
to death a rival's wife and, in following an ancient Rus
sian custom, he gouged out her eyes, thinking that the
eyes would record his image. (Adams 34)
Law enforcers have learned that trained assassins
imported from Siberia and the Ukraine are committing con
tract murders in America. Using business or tourist
visas, they get here, make the hit, and return home as
quickly as possible. (Adams 38, sterling 165) Finding
these gunmen is nearly impossible for U.S. law enforcers.
Also, Russian mobsters import fearless, well-trained
Israeli commandos into America for protection. (Friedman
28)

Money Laundering
Russian mobsters have developed sophisticated ways
to launder their illicit proceeds. Two categories of
money laundering by Russian criminals exist. With the
first category, criminals in Russia transfer their pro
ceeds made from crimes committed there to U.S. banks
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where the money is laundered. The money is then returned
to the criminals in Russia. With the second category,
Russian criminals in America launder their proceeds in
America. The first category tends to be more sophisti
cated and will be discussed first.

The proceeds that criminals in Russia launder tend
to come from narcotics trafficking, fraud, illegal arms
and antiques trading, theft and prostitution. The mob
sters also steal from the Russian government. Forged doc
uments were used to steal about 1.5 trillion rubles (over
$1 billion) from the government in 1992 and 1993. In
1994, the Russian Ministry of Interior said much of the
estimated $50 billion that illegally left Russia came to
America. (Moody 5) The criminals launder the money in a
string of phony companies including banks they set up
throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. The
money is then transferred to tax havens such as Finland,
Switzerland, Luxembourg and the cayman Islands. (Switzer
land and Luxembourg began cracking down harder on money
laundering in 1993.) Large amounts of this money are then
transferred to U.S. banks and converted into U.S. cur
rency, and then returned to Russia where the money is
invested in financial and industrial projects, real
estate and banks. Electronic fund transfer systems can
zip billions of dollars globally in seconds.
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Solving these crimes is difficult since many legiti
mate Russian investment firms, _banks, and other busi
nesses engaging in international commerce need convert
ible currencies, such as U.S. dollars or German marks, to
conduct business. Also, due to Russia's old technology,
Russian companies trying to upgrade or expand their tech
nology must exchange rubles for western currencies to buy
equipment from the West. (Tri-State 22) Determining which
currency exchanges are legal and which ones are not is
difficult for three reasons. First, transferring money
between accounts is legal in America unless it is done
for illegal reasons. Second,· since most currency
exchanges occur in other countries before the money
enters and after it leaves America, following the money
trail is almost impossible. Third, crimes linked to
transfers are usually committed in the country where the
money originates, so establishing jurisdiction over the
crimes may be impossible for U.S. law enforcers even if
they can prove the funds are illicit. (Tri-State 23)
French police said criminals will intentionally commit a
particular crime in several countries so that investiga
tors will get mired in jurisdictional disputes. (Elliott
41)

In a 1994 case, several people helped Vladimir Levin
- a computer hacker in st. Petersburg, Russia � use Citi-
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bank's electronic money transfer system to steal $10 mil
lion from the bank by circumventing its security system
and wire transferring the funds to accounts in America,
Finland, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Russia and
Switzerland.
The mobsters have also smuggled money over interna
tional borders by hiding it in clothing or body cavities.
Yuri Anatoliyevich, an extortionist and arms dealer, pled
guilty in 1994 to smuggling $1.2 million into America.
Russian mobsters in America have developed several
ways to launder their illicit proceeds in America, and
these schemes tend to be simpler than the laundering
their counterparts in Russia commit. Russian mobsters
involved "in fuel tax scams have used their proceeds to
buy vehicles in America which they then shipped to the
Commonwealth of Independent States where they were resold
at three to four times their cost in America. (Tri-state
23). Russian criminals have also laundered, or tried to
launder, their proceeds through hotels and casinos in
Atlantic City, N.J. The casino owners offer the Russian
high rollers limousine service, luxury suites, meal and
alcohol allowances, and s.eating at prime events.
Law enforcers realize that the potential for Russian
money laundering is staggering. U.S. Federal Reserve Gov
ernor Edward Kelley Jr. said at a U.S. House of Represen-
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tatives Banking Committee hearing in 1996 that he esti
mates up to $500 billion is laundered through U.S. banks
annually. Of course, Russian mobsters don't do all of
this laundering but the figures show that the problem is
serious and growing due to the increased use of electro
nic international banking. The manipulation of U.S.
financial institutions could adversely affect America's
economic stability. (Tri-State 24)
Vyacheslav Ivankov
Russian crime groups are not as structured as La
Cosa Nostra families. Members of La Cosa Nostra tend to
commit crimes to support their family but Russian mob
sters tend to work to together only to commit a specific
crime or carry out a certain scheme. U.S. law enforcers
believe Moscow's highest ranking thief in law, Vyacheslav
Ivankov, came to America in January 1993 to better orga
nize all Russian crime groups in America and to improve

links between these groups and the crime groups in Rus

sia. Ivankov - whose nickname was Yaponchik, or Little
Japanese - was considered the boss of Russian organized
crime in America, and a study of Russian crime here would
be incomplete without a short profile on him.
Ivankov is a short, stocky man with an eight-pointed
star tattooed on the front of each of his shoulders,
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indicating that he is a thief in law. He has a long crim
inal history in Russia and in 1980 started Moscow's
Solontsevskaya gang, whose members posed as police offi
cers and robbed rich Russians' homes. In 1981, he was
convicted of a burglary and sentenced to 14 years in
Siberia's Tulun prison but he allegedly bribed a judge
and was released in 1991. (Kleinknecht 284) A chartered
plane flew him from Siberia to Moscow where a welcome
home champagne party was thrown at the plush Metropol
Hotel. (Sterling 15) After violating his parole, Russian
authorities began looking for him and he fled to America
in March 1992. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs
then told the FBI that Ivankov was en route to New York.
On his visa application, he said he was in the film
industry and lied about his criminal past. Federal agents
could have deported him for lying about his past on his
application, but they decided to let him stay so they
could watch him.
Ivankov's cohorts supposedly gave him an apartment
and luxury car out of respect. He lived mainly in Brigh
ton Beach but he had an apartment in Denver, and met with
Russian mobsters in Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York
and Toronto. (Elliott 36, Kleinknecht 284) In November
1994, several of his mobsters began extorting millions of
dollars from Russian and U.S. businesses. (Freeh 18) In
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early 1995, the U.S. branch of his group in Russia had
about 100 members and was America's strongest Russian
crime group. (Kleinknecht 284) Ivankov used a cellular
phone to instruct some of his mobsters to extort money
from Alexander Volkov and Vladimir Voloshin, the Russian
born owners of Summit International Corp., a Wall Street
investment firm. On May 25, 1995, the mobsters kidnapped
the two men at the New York Hilton and took them to a
room above the Troika Restaurant, a hot spot for Russian
mobsters in Fairview, N.J. The criminals forced the two
men to sign an agreement saying they would pay $3.5 mil
lion. But law enforcers had listened in on Ivankov's cel
lular phone conversations and knew what was going on.
After one conversation revealed that the fa�her of one of
the victims had been beaten to death on a Moscow subway
platform, law enforcers decided to intervene. Ivankov was
arrested at his girlfriend's house in Brooklyn on June 8,
1995. Eight other mobsters in the scheme were also
charged with extortion. (Kleinknecht 285, 286)
Law Enforcement's Response to Russian
Organized Crime
Russian organized crime is an international problem
and the FBI is taking an international approach to deal
with it. Highly-skilled senior FBI agents are increas
ingly working with law enforcers in Russia and other
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countries on specific cases. The FBI agents abroad also
warn their fellow agents in America about new and emerg
ing international Grime threats that could affect Amer
ica. The FBI opened an office in Moscow to work with Rus
sian police, and from July 1994 to May 1996, the number
of cases worked on by FBI agents there jumped from 20 to
over 200. (Freeh 4) During the decades of battling La
Cosa Nostra, the FBI learned a few tricks, and passing on
this knowledge to foreign police may be one of the FBI's
most significant responses to Russian organized crime.· By
training Russian police how to fight organized crime, the
FBI can deal with the problem before it even gets to
America.
In.May 1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh told a con
gressional committee that Russian organized crime became
the bureau's top investigative priority when an internal
survey of field offices in April 1992 counted 81 investi
gations involving Eastern European mobsters. (Kleinknecht
275) But the FBI did not set up a Russian organized crime
unit until 1994, and in 1995, many top FBI officials
admitted they still knew little about Russian crime in
America. (Kleinknecht 277) Two of the bureau's main con
cerns involving Russian organized crime at the interna
tional level are the smuggling of nuclear weapons/materi-
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als to terrorists or rogue nations, and narcotics traf
ficking. (Freeh 4, 5)
In 1995, the.FBI and the U.S. State Department
helped open the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Budapest, Hungary. The academy is the main place where
the FBI provides general and specialized training to for
eign law enforcers. The academy offers an eight-week
training program similar to the FBI National Academy Pro
gram at the Quantico Marine Corps Combat Development Com
mand at Quantico, Va. out of the 4,400 foreign law
enforcers that the bureau.trained in fiscal year 1995, 99
of them graduated from the program at the academy in
Budapest. About 200 law enforcers from Albania, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and the
Ukraine were trained at the academy in fiscal year 1996.
Some foreign governments invite FBI agents into their
countries to assess their law enforcement agencies'
strengths and weaknesses. The FBI then advises the host
governments and sets up one- and two-week training pro
grams for their law enforcement agencies. Between Jan. 1
and May 1 of 1996, the FBI trained 212 officers from the
Russian Ministry of Interior in programs in Russia and at
the FBI National Academy Program at Quantico. The U.S.
State Department - through the Freedom Support Act and
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with Support for Eastern European Democracies Funding covers the cost of most of these programs and the academy
in Budapest. (Freeh 6, 7, 9) But attempted coordination
isn't always fruitful. A 1993 meeting at Quantico between
CIA and FBI lawyers ended sourly when the two groups
couldn't decide how to share crime intelligence. (Elliott
41 )

Even more troublesome, Russian law enforcers are
often uncooperative when Western law enforcers seek
information on Russian mobsters. Russia is a member of
Interpol which is designed to increase cooperation
between the police agencies in member states. But Moscow
often fails to respond to requests for checks on Russian
criminals found or arrested in the West. (Adams 39)
Investigating-these criminals is difficult since
very few U.S. law enforcers speak Russian. This makes
infiltrating the crime groups nearly impossible. Before
1993, the New York City Police Department had almost no
Russian-speaking officers. (Friedman 28) Even a cop who
may speak Russian may not know all the language's pecu
liarities well enough to blend in with the mobsters.
Translations of interviews with Russian suspects can be
inaccurate. (Tri-State 3) This lack of language savvy can
lead to other problems as well. One arson suspect wise on
U.S. laws was released after his Miranda rights were read
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to him in Russian. As a Ukrainian, he claimed he couldn't
understand Russian. (Adams 35)
Also, recruiting a detective brave enough to watch
the Organizatsiya took the New York City Police Depart
ment's intelligence unit two years. Russian mobsters are
notoriously vicious and unlike La Casa Nostra members,
they won't hesitate to attack a cop's family. (Friedman
28) Another investigative problem involves the inability
of law enforcers to convince law-abiding members of the
Russian community to become informants. Russian immi

grants who remember what living under an oppressive gov
ernment is like tend to distrust the U.S. government and

U.S. law enforcers. The immigrants are therefore disin

clined to help law enforcers. (Tri-State 3) Law enforcers
will not provide details on how they investigate Russian
criminals or ethnic crime groups because they fear that
the information will reach the criminals themselves.

The Organizatsiya is obviously a growing threat to

America but it certainly isn't the only ethnic crime
threat. Law enforcers have many challenges ahead of them
as the cast of characters in organized crime continues to
grow. In the next chapter we will explore a group that is
in many ways as insidious as Russian crime groups, Chi
nese crime groups.

- CHAPTER V
CHINESE ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA
Introduction
Visitors in America's Chinatowns will often see bus
tling communities with an array of fish stores, restau
rants, souvenir shops and much more. But behind the store
fronts in back rooms often lurks a dark side where plans
for smuggling heroin and prostitutes are devised, where
business owners are forced to pay tribute to the local
crime group, and where rivals are murdered. Chinese orga
nized crime has become a menace that law enforcers fear
will worsen. Although Chinese crime groups have a long
history in their native land, their presence and power in
America was not fully realized until the mid 1970s.
Although Chinese criminals began to make their mark
in America roughly a decade before Russian criminals, the
amount of information available on the two groups is
about equal. This chapter's sources include the FBI, aca
demics, journalists, the U.S. State Department and schol
ars of Chinese history and culture. We will begin by
exploring the three levels of Chinese organized crime:
the secret societies, the criminally-influenced tongs,
and the street gangs. The chapter will discuss why they
101
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started, what they are, and what they do in America. We
will then discuss the types of crimes they commit.
Secret Societies: Their Roots in China and
Their Spread to America
In 1644, Mongol tribesmen overthrew the Ming Dynasty
and set up the Manchu Dynasty. In the early 1800s, the
West was pressuring the Manchu Dynasty to open China for
more trade. South China had an excellent inland waterway
system so most trade with the West occurred there instead
of in North China, which engaged mainly in continental
trade. (Chesneaux 33) Thus, the adverse effects from
trade with the West were felt mainly in South China. A
group in this region became so upset with the situation
that it wanted to dethrone the Manchu Dynasty and to
restore the Ming Dynasty. The group, called the Triad,
consisted of three secret societies: the Heaven and Earth
Society, the Brothers and Elders Society and the Small
Knife society. The Triad believed all people were equal
and, with its plundering and pillaging, set out to take
from the rich and give to the poor. Rich merchants and
rural gentry led the societies to control them and to
share in the plunder. The societies served as cadres for
urban and rural peasants who wanted to revolt. Members
were basically bandits and consisted mainly of artisans,
vagrants and the destitute. China's public officials, the
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mandarins, often negotiated with the Triad instead of
crushing it. (Chesneaux 38, 39)
In the early 1830s, the Triad became very active.
Members attacked military ships and the homes and head
quarters of government officials. They terrorized those
who refused to pay them tribute and, in general, behaved
like the pirates who were wreaking havoc on the South's
rivers and coastal region. (Chesneaux 46) The societies
increasingly rebelled in the cities. The Small Knife
Society controlled Shanghai beginning in 1853. Porters,
boatmen and shopkeepers led the rebellion and proclaimed
the restoration of the Ming Dynasty but the gesture was
only symbolic since they had no one to claim the thrown.
The imperial troops, with help from the West, drove the
rebels out in 1855. Other rebellions occurred as well. A
branch of the Small Knife Society controlled Xiamen, a
port city in the eastern province of Fujian, for a few
months in 1853. The Triad-affiliated Red Turbans failed
to seize Guangzhou, a port city in the southeast province
of Kwangtung, after several months of fighting in 1854.
These rebellions were not isolated incidents but

rather highlights of an ongoing problem. As the West con
tinued to open China to trade, Chinese shipping workers
continued to lose their jobs due to the shifting trade
routes. (Chesneaux 116, 117) Also, goods became increas-
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ingly transported on British and American steam ships
instead of on Chinese junks. Between 1870 and 1880, the
steam ships began to dominate China's inland and coastal
waterways. (Chesneaux 178) Many of the country's unem
ployed boatmen joined the Triad. Peasants whose homes
were destroyed in the fighting and troops discharged
after the fighting also joined the societies. Many of the
boatmen and troops joined the Brothers and Elders Soci
ety. (Chesneaux 117)
The societies continued to attack the homes and
headquarters of government officials, the public grana
ries, the prisons and the homes of the rich, all in
social protest and in discontent with the Manchu Dynasty.
The Triad and the White Lotus group of secret societies
from the rural North launched 49 rebellions between 1860
and 1870, and 55 more between 1870 and 1885. Due in part
to their complicity with the robber bands who lived by
murdering and plundering, the actions of the societies
resembled ordinary banditry and pillaging. (Chesneaux
118) Thus, the peasants liked the societies because the
societies hated the established order but they also
feared the societies because of their brutality. Ironi
cally, no clear difference existed between leaders of the
societies and leaders of the establishment. Some members
of the upper-class circles became society heads to obtain
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clout while maintaining relations with their old elite
cohorts. Some of these leaders went back and forth
between the two camps, depending on what they could gain.
(Chesneaux 119)
In late 1894, sun Yat-sen of Guangzhou founded a
secret society called the Revive China Society which,
along with other Guangzhou-area societies, planned a
rebellion which was to begin on Oct. 26, 1895. Their goal
was to topple the Manchu Dynasty but the plot fell apart
and sun fled to Japan. (Chesneaux 307) He and his follow
ers regrouped before he returned to China. Sun had an
agreement with Japan that it would assist in a rebellion
in Kwangtung. His forces - consisting of over 20,000
peasants, society members, Chinese Christians and others
- gathered near Shantou, a city in Kwangtung, in early
October 1900. They marched to Xiamen before Japan grew
fearful of international complications and backed out.
The rebels dispersed due to a lack of weapons but due to
their effort, many young patriots decided to join them.
(Chesneaux 339)
However, Sun and his followers did not initiate the
rebellion that ended the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. Men from
the province of Hupei's army who opposed the Manchu
Dynasty joined the Literary study Society. This society
and the Common Advancement Association, which included
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revolutionary intellectuals, seized Wuhan, a major city
in Hupei, on Oct. 11, 1911. One by one, 10 of China's 16
provinces claimed their independence from Beijing in
October and November of 1911. The Republic of China was
established and on Jan. 1, 1912, sun was named its presi
dent. (Chesneaux 370-372, 376)
Through Sun, the secret societies gained access to
China's political power. He became a senior official in
the Chung Wo Tong Society in Hong Kong and the Kwok On
Wui Society in Honolulu and Chicago before dying in 1925.
(Kleinknecht 101) By then, the secret societies had
become full-blown criminal organizations, many of which
could trace their lineage to the Triad. Sun and the soci
ety member who succeeded him as president, General Chiang
Kai-shek, allowed the groups to engage in extortion, nar
cotics smuggling and prostitution. In 1927, the leader of
Shanghai's Green Gang Society, Tu Yueh Sheng, was made a
major general in the Chinese army and was allowed to
illegally export opium from China.
Hong Kong increasingly became the base for the soci
eties. The powerful sun Yee On Society was formed there
in 1919. After the Communist takeover of China in 1949,
many societies, including the Green Gang society, moved
their operations to Hong Kong. Former members of Hung Fat
Shan, the Guangzhou-based branch of the Heaven and Earth
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Society, moved to Hong Kong and, in the early 1950s,
formed the 14K Society. Thousands of American Gis who got
hooked on Southeast Asian heroin during the Vietnam War
took their habit with them when they left and the societ
ies followed this market. Many soldiers were stationed in
Europe so the 14K Society set up a branch in Amsterdam.
Today, about 50 societies and society-related groups are
based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, the most powerful being
the Wo Hop To Society, the Sun Yee On Society and the 14K
Society. The societies have controlled much of the
island's entertainment industry and frequently infil
trated the Royal Hong Kong Police. (Kleinknecht 102, 103,
Abadinsky 275, Criminal Investigative Division 11, 39,
sterling 153)
In 1996, the Hong Kong police estimated that the
societies had tens of thousands of members. Many of their
members live in or frequently visit America but studies
show that many of the crimes they commit here do not
benefit their society; members often commit crimes to
benefit themselves. The societies typically do not have
central authorities such as La Cosa' Nostra families have.
Society leaders typically do not control their under
lings' activities. Membership merely provides access to
more criminal opportunities. But societies that adhere to
traditional rituals tend to be more organized and to have
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a central authority. The societies, including those with
members in America, often work with each other. Nonmem
bers_ with friends who are members generally tolerate and
do not report on crimes committed by a society. Members
in America often work independently from their societies
in Hong Kong and typically engage in illegal gambling,
extortion, murder, firearms violations, alien smuggling,
drug trafficking and prostitution. (Criminal Investiga
tive Division 11, 38)
The best known secret society is probably the 14K.
It was led by a former army general, Kot Siu Wong, and
gained prominence in Hong Kong by nearly monopolizing the
flow of heroin from Southeast Asia. (Kleinknecht 102) The
14K Society is not well organized, has nearly autonomous
subgroups, and has no sharply defined hierarchy. These
subgroups frequently quarrel with each other and have
quarrels within themselves. Investigating the 14K is dif
ficult due to the diversity of the subgroups and diver
sity of their activities. Members and associates in San
Francisco smuggle counterfeit U.S. currency from Hong
Kong to San Francisco. (Criminal Investigative Division
39, 40)
The 47,000-member sun Yee On Society performs tradi
tional rituals and is well organized. This society is
also linked to the Tung On Tong in America and the tang's
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criminal arm, the Tung On Gang. Former and current Sun
Yee on members have joined or worked with the criminal
groups in America, most notably the Tung On Tong's New
York City chapter. (Kleinknecht 142, criminal Investiga
tive Division 40)
The Wo Hop To Society's formidable tentacles emerged
in the San Francisco area in the early 1980s. The society
worked with the Bay Area's Hop Sing Tong and recruited
members from the rival Wah Ching Gang into the tong. The
Wo Hop To Society also absorbed two area Vietnamese
gangs, including the Hung Pho Gang, The society's U.S.
headquarters was the New Paradise nightclub in Oakland.
It has front businesses and invites popular Chinese and
Hong Kong entertainers to perform in America. It also
engages in heroin trafficking, murder, gambling, extor
tion, loan-sharking, robbery, bookmaking and other
crimes. One top member, Raymond Chow, ran a brothel in
Pacifica, a city just south of San Francisco. The Wo Hop
To's top man in America, Peter Chong, became known as the
lo yan ka, or elder, of San Francisco's Chinatown. Chong
fled to Hong Kong after authorities began cracking down
on the society in 1992. (Kleinknecht 141-158, Criminal
Investigative Division 40)

Criminally-influenced Tongs -in America

110

This section will discuss a different type of Chi
nese organized crime group. While Chinese secret soci
eties are typically based in Hong Kong, tongs (and the
gangs that will be discussed in this chapter) are typi
cally based in America. The word tong simply means
"meeting hall" or "gathering place." Tongs are fraternal
associations, are registered as nonprofit organizations,
and only some of them engage in criminal activity. To
understand how and why they emerged, we must again go
back in history, but this time to when Chinese began
immigrating to America.
Chinese, mainly from the Kwangtung province, began
immigrating to America during the California Gold Rush of
1848-49. The first American Chinatown was established in
1849 in San Francisco when about 300 Chinese met in a
restaurant to elect a leader. In 1852, about 25,000 Chi
nese were living there. About 10,000 Chinese helped build
the first transcontinental railroad in 1869 but Califor
nians forgot this accomplishment in the 1870s when the
Gold Rush died out and depression set in. The unemployed
blamed the Chinese for taking American jobs and treated
them as scapegoats. Dennis Kearney, who rose from finan
cial ruin to become a political demagogue, whipped Cali
fornians into a frenzy of hate with the slogan, "The Chi-
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nese must go." Some Chinese were lynched or forced to
leave. Many of them headed to Chicago, New York, Phila
delphia and other cities where they established new Chi
natowns. As victims of this racism, the Chinese rarely
mixed with whites. The Chinatowns became isolated pockets
with little influence from the outside. (Kleinknecht 103,
104)

Dominant families or district associations con
trolled the Chinatowns. These groups rejected immigrants
with rare last names and immigrants from small districts.
Rejects could live in the Chinatowns but the controlling
groups would not help them. These rejects then united to
form tongs. (Chin 215) The tongs provided benevolent
social and cultural support and helped newcomers find
legitimate jobs or start legitimate businesses. (Criminal
Investigative Division 9) The tongs accepted anyone and
grew rapidly. Unfortunately, some tongs began to commit
crime. The tongs eventually seized power from the domi
nant families and district associations in the China
towns. Of the 30 tongs that formed in America, some of
the most active include the San Francisco-based Chih Kung
Tong and two New York City-based tongs, the Hip Sing
Association and the On Leong Chinese Merchants Associa
tion.
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America's first tong, the Chih Kung Tong (spelled as
"Chee Kung" by some), was formed in 1850 in San Francisco
as the U.S. branch of China's Heaven and Earth Society.
The tong helped raise money that funded Sun Yat-sen's·
rebellions against the Manchu Dynasty. The tong kidnapped
women for prostitution, extorted money from merchants and
brothels, opened its own brothels, opium dens and gam
bling halls, and bribed police. Most of the city's esti
mated 300 opium dens were in Chinatown. The area became
such a spectacle of vice that guided tours were offered
to whites who wanted to see it first hand. (Chin 215,
Kleinknecht 105) Other tongs soon after formed in San
Francisco and extremely violent turf wars ensued.
The most legendary tong wars occurred in New York
City's Chinatown between the On Leong and the Hip Sing.
The On Leong began in Boston in 1894 and moved to New
York in 1904. The emerging Hip Sing picked a fight with
the more established On Leong and the battle continued
for over 20 years. The war claimed an estimated 350 lives
in 1909 alone. Most of the violence occurred at a sharp
bend on Doyers Street known as "Bloody Angle" where the
killers would wait for their victims to turn the corner
before striking. The violence became so bad that the
Chinese government arranged a treaty between the two
tongs in 1913 but the agreement later fell apart. By
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1927, Bloody Angle became known as the deadliest spot in
America. (Kleinknecht 107, 108, Abadinsky 277)
This violence led to major changes in Chinese immi
gration and in America's Chinatowns. The Immigration Act
of 1924 diminished the flow of Chinese into America, and
in the 1930s the Chinatowns either cleaned up their acts
or disappeared. While gambling and some other crimes con
tinued, the opium dens closed and the enslavement of
Asian women in basement brothels ended. America had 28
Chinatowns in 1939 and only 16 in 1955. Crime became rare
in the surviving Chinatowns. In 1964, only one arrest was
recorded for a serious crime in New York's Chinatown.
(Kleinknecht 108, 109)
Unfortunately, this trend ended. The Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1965 resulted with an influx of
Chinese immigrants in America, especially in New York's
Chinatown where the population grew to about 150,000 by
1980. The enclave expanded north into Little Italy, east
into the traditionally Jewish Lower East Side, and sur
passed San Francisco's Chinatown to become America's
largest Chinese community. With this influx came a bar
rage of secret society-linked gangsters from Hong Hong's
slums. For many of the Chinese immigrants who couldn't
speak English, learning in the schools was difficult and
decent-paying jobs were hard to find. (Kleinknecht 110)
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Some of these immigrants turned to crime to make a liv
ing by joining tongs, street gangs, or both.
Chinese street gangs will be discussed in the next
section but their relation to tongs will be discussed
here. Tongs typically have gangs commit many of their
crimes for them. The gangs, which are generally less
sophisticated, typically use violence or threats of vio
lence to protect the tongs' criminal interests. The
tong's fung jun is thought to be the liaison to the gang
and often instructs the gang leader, or dai lo (big
brother). The dai lo then instructs his gangsters.
Basically, the gangs do the tongs' dirty work. Using a
chain of command to separate the actual crime from those
who direct the crime makes prosecuting the tong leaders
difficult - a tactic perfected by La Cosa Nostra. For
their efforts, gang leaders are often promoted to their
affiliated tongs. (Criminal Investigative Division 10,
33) Tongs are also known for working with the Hong Kong
based secret societies.
Tongs are typically well structured. They have a
president, a vice president, a secretary, a treasurer, an
auditor, and several representatives. Most tong members
work outside of the tongs and have their own businesses.
They elect the tongs' officers and pay their dues regu
larly but are not involved in the tongs' daily affairs or
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decision making. Only the tongs' officers and employees
run the tongs. (Chin 221)
The On Leong Ghinese Merchant Association has 30,000
to 40,000 members and has chapters in 20 U.S. cities. The
chapters in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleve
land, Miami, Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Washington,
D.c., as well as the New York base are all known to be
criminally active. The on Leong works with the Ghost
Shadows Gang. (Chin 221, Criminal Investigative Division
10}
The Hip Sing Association has tens of thousands of
members and has chapters in 16 U.S. cities. The chapters
in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Cleveland, Den
ver, Houston, New Orleans, Portland, San Francisco, Seat
tle, and Washington, D.C. and the New York base are known
to commit crimes including money laundering and illegal
gambling. The Hip Sing works with the Flying Dragons
Gang. (Criminal Investigative Division 10).
Three other tongs in New York City include the Tung
On Association, Tsung Tsin Association and the Fukien
American District Association. (Chin 216) Two San Fran
cisco tongs besides the Chih Kung include the Hop Sing
Tong and the suey Sing Tong.

Chinese Gangs in America
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Many Chinese youths who came to America after 1965
faced many obstacles here. At schools, the teenage immi
grants were often put in classes with young children.
Also, American-born Chinese youths, or ABCs, ridiculed
the newcomers and called them FOBs, meaning fresh off the
boat. some of these ridiculed youths united into gangs.
San Francisco's Wah Ching (Chinese Youth) Gang was formed
in 1964 and membership mushroomed after 1965. The gang
originated as a legitimate movement aimed at convincing
area businesses to give gang members jobs. The gang pick
eted San Francisco City Hall demanding jobs and recrea
tion facilities. (Kleinknecht 110, 111) The gang!s other
goal was to protect its members from American-born Chinese. (Chin 217)
As the gang grew, it increasingly committed crime.
In the late 1960s, the gang was extorting up to $200 a
month from area merchants. In 1968, area leaders met with
the Wah Ching's leaders and told them to stop terrorizing
the community. The gangsters said they would continue the
crime unless area businesses paid them $4,000. The money
was never paid and the crime continued. The tongs grew
fearful that the gangs would jeopardize their gambling
operations and threatened to kill any gangsters that
tried extorting money from business owners. The plan
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failed so the tongs decided to work with the gangs. The
Hop Sing Tong paid the Wah Ching Gang to protect its
gambling halls and to use its muscle in other crimes.
(Kleinknecht 112) A Wah Ching leader who disliked the
arrangement with the tong defected in 1969 and started
the Yau Lai (or Yo Le) Gang, which evolved into the Joe
Fong Boys.
The Wah Ching and the Joe Fong Boys became China
town's dominant gangs. The gangsters continued to extort
money from area merchants and those who didn't pay had
their facilities vandalized or destroyed. The murder rate
jumped also. Eighteen Chinese gang-related murders
occurred in San Francisco between 1969 and 1974, and 27
gang-related murders occurred in just Chinatown between
1974 and 1977. (Chin 217) One of the most gruesome inci
dents occurred at 2:40 a.m. on Sept. 4, 1977 at the Gol
den Dragon Restaurant in Chinatown. Three masked members
of the Joe Fong Boys entered the restaurant with the
intention of killing Wah Ching leader Michael Louie and
other Wah Ching members who were dining there. One gunman
sprayed the room with a .45-caliber machine gun, killing
Fong Wong, a 48-year-old waiter with six children. An
aspiring young actress, Carolina Sanchez, was shot in the
jaw as she fled the room using a chair as a shield. The
gunman then thought he saw Louie sitting at a table with
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three women and proceeded to drill him in the head and
chest. The woman sitting next to him tried shielding him
with her body and she too was killed. Another woman at
the table was then riddled with bullets from head to toe,
paralyzing her. The third woman was shot in the face and
disfigured for life. Then another gunman fired buckshot
from a 12-gauge shotgun at two 18-year-old men at another
table. Calvin Fong died instantly and Robert Yuen died a
few days later. When the 90-second massacre was over, 16
people were bleeding on the floor. Ironically, the gunmen
never got their targets. The Wah Ching members fled
through a back door before the Joe Fong Boys entered the
room. The man they thought was Louie was actually Paul
Wada, a 25-year-old Japanese-American who was celebrating
his graduation from law school. Wada was with his girl
friend and two of her friends from Seattle. (Kleinknecht
1-4) The incident shocked the nation and San Francisco
law enforcers realized they had a serious problem in Chi
natown.
The Golden Dragon massacre was a pivotal moment for
Chinese organized crime in America and for organized
crime in general. While La Cosa Nostra was just starting
to quiet down, a new, vicious ethnic crime group was
emerging. In the early 1980s, the California Bureau of
Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence upgraded the
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state's largest Chinese gang, the Wah Ching, from a
street gang to an organized crime group. With its 600-700
members and approximate 200 hard-core members, the Wah
Ching is considered one of California's main organized
crime groups.
Other Chinese gangs that were formed in San Fran
cisco include the Young Suey Sing Gang, the Hop Sing
Boys, the Kit Jais Gang, the Asian Invasion, the Eddy
Boys, the Chinese Playground Boys and the Ping Boys. Chi
nese gangs operating in Los Angeles include the.Wah Ching
and two Taiwanese groups, the United Bamboo Gang and the
Four Seas Gang. (Chin 217, 218)
New York City has the most Chinese gangs. In 1964,
the Chung Yee Gang was founded and an On Leong Chinese
Merchants Association leader started a martial arts group
called the On Leong Youth Club, which evolved into the
White Eagles Gang. (Chin 218) The Quen Ying Gang was
formed around 1966 and later evolved into the Ghost Sha
dows Gang, and the Flying Dragons Gang emerged around
1967 with the Hip Sing Association as its parent organi
zation. Some gangs started out as independent but many of
them became street crews for tongs. Gang members lived in
apartments that tongs rented, ate in tong-owned restau
rants, and detached themselves from school and family.
The tongs' inability to fully control the gangs led to
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increased terror in New York's Chinatown. The complaint
rate of violent crime in the Fifth Precinct reached a
record high in 1976. Man Bun Lee, a former president of
the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, publicly
asked law enforcers in 1977 to crack down on the gangs.
An assassin working for the Ghost Shadows Gang soon after
stabbed Lee five times but he survived. The incident sent
a message that gang antagonizers were unsafe.
By late 1976, the gangs expanded their operations by
extorting money from Chinese business owners outside of
Chinatown, in other parts of Manhattan. Other Chinese
gangs that emerged in New York include the Fuk Ching
(Fujian Youth), the White Tigers, the Tong on, the Green
Dragons, the Golden Star, the Freemasons, the Taiwanese
Brotherhood, the White Dragons, and the Black Shadows (a
female gang). (Chin 219-221) The FBI has nearly disman
tled the Fuk Ching Gang. The New York City area has an
estimated 300 Chinese gang members.
Gang members are mostly male and are in their teens
to early 30s. Gang leaders are generally in their late
20s or early 30s. Many gangs have 20 to 50 hard-core mem
bers, a few inactive members and several associates.
Reinfor9ements from chapters in other cities are brought
in when conflicts occur between gangs. (Criminal Investi
gative Division 12, 35)
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Tong-affiliated gangs are highly structured. Most of
these gangs in New York have more than one leader or fac
tion and operate in more than one location. The Flying
Dragons Gang has at least two dai dai los {big big broth
ers) who take instructions from the Hip Sing Association.
These dai dai los control three gang factions on Manhat
tan and three more in Queens, and the dai dai los
instruct each faction's leader, or dai lo {big brother).
Each faction has one dai lo and about 15 members. Under
the dai lo, there are yee los or sam los, and ma jais
(little horses) or lian jais (little kids). The little
horses only take orders from their immediate supervisors
and do n?t know their dai lo. They are taught to not ask
about their leaders. {Chin 222) Thus, arrested or

indicted little horses can't squeal on their leaders. The
FBI believes that gangs are becoming increasingly orga
nized. {Criminal Investigative Division 36, 37)
We will now discuss the types of crimes that Chinese
crime groups commit including heroin trafficking, illegal
gambling, money laundering, prostitution, illegal alien
smuggling, intimidation of business owners, violence and
robbery.

Heroin Trafficking
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The amount of heroin that Chinese crime groups smug
gled from Southea�t Asia into America increased signifi
cantly after 1983 when many gambling halls in New York's
Chinatown began closing and the gangs needed another
income source. Authorities estimated in 1984 that Chinese
groups imported 20 percent of the heroin in America and
40 percent of the heroin in New York City. In December
1987, about 60 percent of New York's heroin was Asian. In
terms of narcotics, what happens in New York affects the
entire East Coast. Heroin is made from morphine which is
the principal alkaloid of opium. The Chinese-smuggled
heroin - which comes mainly from the Golden Triangle
(Thailand, Laos and Myanmar) - is known for its purity
and is called "China White." A surge of heroin overdoses
occurred in the summer of 1987 due to this purity. Law
enforcers in 1987 solved over 20 major Chinese-related
drug-trafficking cases and seized 200 kilograms of China
White. (Chin 227, 228) About 1,458 metric tons of opium
was produced worldwide in 1985 and about 3,054 metric
tons was produced in just Southeast Asia by 1989. By
then, a kilogram of heroin bought for $7,000 in Bangkok
could be sold for $90,000 in New York. (Kleinknecht 136,
139)
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Tong members and Chinese gang leaders traffic and
distribute heroin but no single Chinese crime group domi
nates the heroin trade. Authorities arrested several gang
leaders in 1987. Paul Tang, an On Leong associate and
Ghost Shadows mentor, was arrested for selling several
pounds of heroin to undercover agents. Michael Yu, a Fly
ing Dragons member, and 39 non-Flying Dragons were
arrested for importing 100 pounds of heroin.
In 1987, the Flying Dragons' 34-year-old leader,
Johnny Eng, was arrested in Hong Kong for smuggling the
drug. New York authorities also indicted him for two
major drug cases. Eng, who invested his money in New York
restaurants and South American farms, smuggled 160 pounds
of heroin into America by hiding it in Chinese tea boxes.
The boxes were mixed with Chinese herbal medicine to hide
the drug's smell. In September 1988, he smuggled 183
pounds of heroin into Boston by hiding it in the steel
roller of a bean sprout washer. In late 1992, Eng was
convicted in a Brooklyn federal court, and in 1993 he was
sentenced to 24 years in prison and fined $3.5 million.
Leaders of the Tung On Gang, the Fuk Ching Gang and
the Green Dragons also trafficked heroin. Gang leaders
typically hire nongang members to travel between America
and Hong Kong to network with southeast Asian drug pro
ducers and dealers. Authorities believe gang leaders do
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not involve their gangs in trafficking. (Chin 228, 242,
Kleinknecht 138, Abadinsky 282, 283)
Tong members also smuggle drugs. An On Leong member
was a broker between heroin importers and buyers. Law
enforcers arrested him and 30 others, and seized over 800
pounds of heroin and about $3 million in cash. (Chin 228)
Kon Yu-Leung, also known as Johnny Kon, was the most
prolific Chinese heroin smuggler ever arrested by U.S.
authorities. Kon, a member of Hong Kong's Wo On Lok Soci
ety, recruited several jewelry thieves from the island's
Big Circle Gang to form a heroin-smuggling gang called
the Flaming Eagles. Kan's gang smuggled over 1,700 pounds
of heroin, about $2 billion worth, into America from 1984
until he was arrested in March 1988. The drug was shipped
in ice buckets, vases, picture frames and other contain
ers. Kon owned a trading company in Newark, N.J., a watch
company in Paraguay, a $1 million home in Panama City,
Panama, commercial real estate in San Francisco, a movie
theater in New York's Chinatown and part of a shopping
mall in Queens. For his wife, he bought a $400,000 home
in Short Hills, New Jersey. Authorities seized 126 pounds
of his heroin in a fishing trawler in Hong Kong harbor in
1984 but U.S. authorities didn't have enough evidence to
arrest him until October 1986 when an arrested Flaming
Eagle squealed on his boss. Kon became the Drug Enforce-
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ment Agency's No. 1 fugitive until March 1988 when eight
DEA agents interrupted his fried chicken dinner at the
New York Hilton. Kon had a $25,000 diamond-studded Piaget
watch on his wrist and $32 in his pocket. (Kleinknecht
138, 139, Surovell 96)
The Chinese are one of the most active international
heroin-smuggling groups, and authorities expect them to
expand their trafficking into mainstream America. (Chin
228) In 1994, 57 percent of the heroin in America came
from Southeast Asia. Members and associates of Asian drug
groups are active in Canada, Houston, Los Angeles, New
Orleans, New York, San Francisco and Seattle. The
increasing availability and popularity of heroin led to a
90 percent jump in heroin-related overdoses between 1990
and 1996.
The former Shan United Army and the United Wa State
Army, two insurgent groups in Northeast Myanmar that are
members of the country's National Democratic Front, domi
nate Southeast Asia's heroin production. The Shan United
Army's leader, Khun Sa, is Asia's most famous opium pro
ducer. In the hilly region of Myanmar's eastern state of
Shan, Khun Sa and his 15,000 men produce up to 80 percent
of the Golden Triangle's heroin. They grow the opium pop
pies, process the opium into heroin in jungle laborato
ries and protect the caravans that take the drug to Myan-
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mar's borders. The heroin is first sold to the Chinese
and Thai, two groups that are increasingly working with
Colombian drug traffickers. Cambodia, Korea, Taiwan,
Vietnam and mainland China are also increasingly engaging
in the heroin business. To smuggle heroin, the crime
groups typically hide it in containers on commercial
ships, in air cargo and in mail parcels. (Criminal Inves
tigative Division 27, 28, 54, Kleinknecht 137) In New
York, authorities found over 850 pounds of heroin inside
hollowed-out lawn-mower wheels. The wheels were shipped
from Hong Kong to Seattle, then railroaded east.
(Kleinknecht 138)
Research shows that an increasing number of Chinese
drug smugglers are not tong or gang members. This new
bread of smugglers is richer, smarter and better con
nected with foreign associates. They can act quickly when
opportunities arise and can quickly terminate an opera
tion when the mission is completed. These temporary oper
ations are also more difficult to investigate than tradi
tional Chinese crime groups. (Chin 228, criminal Investi
gative Division 27, 55) The powerful Sicilian Mafia helps
to distribute Asian heroin worldwide. (Sterling 152)

Illegal Gambling ·

127

Gambling was a mainstay in America's Chinatowns for
a long time until around 1983 when many gamblers in New
York's Chinatown began going to Atlantic city where they
could gamble legally and watch Chinese entertainers flown
in by secret societies. (Surovell 96) Also, many Chinese
learned to enjoy taking a bus to a classy Atlantic City
casino instead of cramming into a dirty, smoke-filled
basement. (Kleinknecht 135) However, gambling still
exists in the Chinatowns and should be discussed, espe
cially since the problem often involves other crimes such
as money laundering.
Chinatowns typically have low-stakes and high-stakes
gambling clubs. Small family or district associations run
the low-stakes clubs which are open only to well
acquainted members, friends and relatives. The gambling
occurs roughly from 4 p.m. to 1 a.m and is considered a
social activity. Winnings and losses are roughly about
$300. The most popular games are mahjong and 13-card
poker, and the associations take a 5 percent commission
on the bets. These clubs are usually peaceful and do not
attract gangs.
The high-stakes clubs generally never close, and
activity peaks after midnight. Professional dealers run
the games which include mahjong, poker, pai gow and fan
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tan. The club's shareholders take a 5 percent commission
on the bets. The tong that controls the area around the
club often owns the club. Customers include heavy gam
blers, illegal aliens and gangsters. Robbery, extortion
and murder often occur at these clubs due to the high
cash flow. Gangs often protect the clubs and their
patrons from the police, intruders or rival gangs.
Tongs with basements or halls will often rent the
facilities to their members. The tongs generally have no
restrictions on how the facilities may be used and will
sometimes help renters who use the facilities for gam
bling.
Tongs and Chinese gangs also control gambling in
California's Chinatowns and are expanding their gambling
operations beyond the Chinatowns. In the state's suburban
areas, Chinese gangs own and operate many legal gambling
clubs which offer high-stakes games such as pai gow,
which is an ancient Chinese domino game, and fan tan.
(Chin 223, 224) These clubs are similar to Las Vegas and
Atlantic City casinos but have sections with Chinese
games for their Asian patrons. The criminals use the
clubs for drug trafficking, loansharking, extortion and
robbery. They also launder and skim the clubs' profits.
(Criminal Investigative Division 13) Money laundering in
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these clubs will be discussed in the Money Laundering
section.
In 1988, federal agents raided the On Leong Chinese
Merchants Association's Chicago headquarters and found
over $320,000 in cash and records revealing that money
had been extorted from local Chinese merchants. In 1990,
29 of the tong's leaders from Chicago, Houston and New
York were charged with running an $11.5 million gambling
operation. The Chicago headquarters was open for gambling
daily from 9:30 a.m. to 7 p.m. The facility was forfeited
to the government after the bust. In 1994, on Leong lead
ers were convicted of bribing police, running the gam
bling operation, and paying monthly street taxes of
$8,000 to Chicago's La Cosa Nostra family and $4,000 to
Pittsburgh's family. The tong leaders were also convicted
of bribing a state judge to fix a murder case involving
three Chinese gangsters who were brought from New York to
Chicago to kill a rival. (Abadinsky 277, 278, Chin 216)
Money Laundering
The FBI believes money laundering methods used by
Chinese crime groups are relatively simple. The only
method unique to Asian crime groups is the underground
banking system. Canada is often used as an intermediate
point for money that is being transported and laundered
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between Hong Kong and America. Hong Kong is a major laun
dering hub because it does not require incoming and out
going currency to be reported, and because Chinese crime
groups traffic much of their heroin through Hong Kong.
Physically smuggling money is the most common laun
dering method. Couriers, called "mules," carry bulk cash
on themselves or in luggage out of America. They then
deposit the money into bank accounts, often in Canada,
where it can be wire transferred to bank accounts in Hong
Kong and other tax havens. Mules also smuggle money
directly from America to Hong Kong on commercial jets.
Also, cash is frequently smuggled to Hong Kong by mailing
it via parcel post. The Royal Hong Kong Police said the
average package contains about $50,000.
Another laundering method involves the evasion of
deposit reporting. Asian criminals who deposit under
$10,000 into a bank account can avoid having the deposit
reported. Only deposits over $10,000 are reported. Bank
officials rarely notice illicit deposits of under $10,000
because so many legal and illegal deposits occur.
Money is also laundered in gambling clubs or casinos
that cater to Chinese. Chinese criminals often bring
cash-filled suitcases into the clubs where the money can
be laundered in three main ways.
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1. Drug suppliers and their dealers will play rigged
games against each other and not against the club. The
dealers buy their drugs from the suppliers by letting the
suppliers win the games. Thus, the supplier appears to
have obtained the money by winning it instead of by mak
ing it from selling drugs.

2. Mules who physically smuggle cash abroad prefer
to smuggle large-denomination bills since they weigh less
and require less space. Trading in a huge stash of small
denomination bills for large bills at a bank can look
suspicious so the criminals do it in the gambling clubs.
They use small bills to buy chips and then without using
the chips, the criminals cash them in for large bills.

The criminals can also do this by depositing small bills
into a credit account at the club and then withdraw the
money in large bills later.

3. The interconnected worldwide casino network
enables criminals to deposit cash at one branch and then
have it wire transferred to another branch abroad where
it can be withdrawn.

Chinese crime groups also launder money through
their legitimate businesses, especially restaurants,
wholesale fish firms, travel agencies and garment-manu
facturing firms.
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Import/export companies can launder money by wire
transferring money abroad. The companies claim the money
is to pay for foreign goods coming to America but in
reality, no goods come to America. Using fake invoices,
the crime groups try to disguise the laundering as a
sale. Sometimes the companies will transfer more money
than they are actually paying for the goods coming to
America. The difference between what they transfer and
what they actually pay is the amount being laundered.
Money launderers often use illicit proceeds to buy
cars, jewelry, gold and diamonds. They ship the items to
China and Hong Kong where they are sometimes sold for
profit. Turning the cash into more tangible goods makes
the illicit proceeds appear more legitimate. Also, sel
ling the goods for a profit increases the crime groups'
income.
Crime groups sometimes launder their money in Hong
Kong by investing it in the securities market under false
names, allowing brokers to buy and sell in Hong Kong and
other countries.
Money is laundered through China's ancient under
ground banking system which was used to transfer money
between parties without alerting the government. The sys
tem, which prevails throughout Asia and has expanded to
U.S. Chinatowns, is a culturally and socially accepted
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covert barter system for trusted and reputable people
only. Chinese drug traffickers use the system to trans
port drugs or large sums of cash abroad without govern
ment detection. Determini�g the amount laundered through
the system is nearly impossible since no transactions are
recorded.
Crime groups launder money through legitimate credit
card companies' international wire transferring systems.
The process requires cooperation between shady merchants
who accept credit card payments and those with money to
launder. The one with cash to launder will act like a
customer and pretend to make a purchase. He receives no
product or service from the merchant but will use his
illicit proceeds to pay his credit card bill. The credit
card company then sends the money to the merchant who is
still cooperating with the money launderer. (Criminal
Investigative Division 57-62)
Prostitution
Chinese crime groups have been associated with pros
titution since the 1800s but the problem surged in the
1970s when an influx of single Chinese immigrants entered
America. Korean prostitutes working in Korean-owned mas
sage parlors were the first to meet the growing demand.
The Chinese eventually took over the prostitution busi-
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ness since they were the main patrons. New York City had
over 20 parlors in 1985 and many parlors opened in other
U.S. Chinatowns. Gangs protect the parlors and some gang
leaders own parlors.
Travel agents in Taiwan find women who are willing
to work as prostitutes in U.S. parlors. Some women sign
one-year contracts and are then given tourist visas, air
tickets and loaned between $7,500 and $12,500. All travel
costs are to be paid back. Most of the women are Korean,
Chinese and Malaysian. Chinese prostitutes are often
called sing song girls. The tourist visas allow the
women to stay for six months but the visas can be
extended for another six months. (Chin 227) Some women
agree to pay up to $30,000 to be illegally smuggled into
America. (This is discussed in the Illegal Alien Smug
gling section.) The parlor managers keep the women work
ing and often hold their visas until the passage fee is
paid off and/or until the one-year contract expires. Some
women are required to continue working even after they've
fulfilled their so-called obligations. Many of these
women are in New York's Chinatown. Some arrive in Houston
to go on a seven-state circuit of massage parlors, or in
Chicago to go on a six-state circuit. (Winick 292)
Chinese-run nightclubs hire young Asian women to
drink and dance with patrons and allow the patrons to
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take the women out after the clubs close. (Chin 227) The
prostitutes are also known for working in modeling stu
dios, hair salons and other types of businesses. (Winick
291)
In July 1984, a senior special agent with the Immi
gration and Naturalization Service, James Goldman, and
his partner, Glen Reyes, began investigating an interna
tional prostitution ring run by a middle-aged Taiwanese
mother of three, Shih Hsaio Pao, and her daughter, I Huei
Chin. The investigation began with an anonymous tip from
a Chinese-American who alleged that a residence at 148
Baxter st. in Chinatown was a brothel. ·Goldman watched
the gang-protected site and noticed that most of the
traffic consisted of Asian males. He learned that Shih
owned the brothel and another one at 686 Sixth Ave. in
Chinatown. Using telephone records, Goldman found that
many calls were made from the two brothels to South and
Central America, Houston, San Francisco and Lakewood,
Colo. He learned through an informant that Madam Shih
wanted to expand her business.
To get information on the enterprise, Goldman
recruited two detectives from the New York City Police
Department, Albert Chan and Louie Chan (no relation).
Albert posed as a wealthy businessman who was interested
in helping her expand, and Louie posed as his bodyguard.

136

The pair met Shih and I Huei Chin at an elegant Japanese
restaurant. Shih told the detectives that her son was a
travel agent in Taiwan who had a knack for recruiting
cash-strapped cosmeticians, factory workers and hotel
maids. The women signed contracts stating they would pay
back the travel expenses by working for Shih. Her son
gave the women money to buy air tickets and money for
other travel costs.
Customers paid $80 for a session with one of Shih's
prostitutes. Of that amount, the women kept $42, the
brothels took $30, and the remaining $8 went to the son
in Taiwan. If a girl ran away, Shih said her associates
could find her since they had each of their prostitutes'
phone numbers and home addresses in Asia. since customers
liked having new or different girls, Shih rotated the
women between her brothels in New York, Houston, San
Francisco and Lakewood. Thanks in part to the recorded
conversation, Goldman had enough evidence to execute
search and arrest warrants at the crime ring's brothels
and homes.
Goldman's task force included INS agents and police
officers in New York, San Francisco, Lakewood and East
Brunswick, N.J. Several Chinese gangsters, including one
with a loaded and cocked .22-caliber pistol disguised as
a ballpoint pen, guarded the Baxter street site which had
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been fortified with three steel-locked doors. Authorities
confiscated guns at the Lakewood brothel, seized I Huei
Chin's $92,000 East Brunswick condo, and found in safe
deposit boxes bankbooks indicating the mother and daugh
ter had over $100,000. The boxes also contained over
$17,000 in jewelry, gold, jade and pearls.
This case was the first time the INS used the Racke
teer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute. At the
June 1986 trial in the U.S. District Court on Manhattan,
12 prostitutes testified against the defendants. One
woman said she was flown from Asia to Bolivia, El Salva
dor, Guatemala and then Mexico where she was smuggled
over the border into Texas. She was held captive in
houses in Texas until being sent to New York. The women
described how they were urged to pay off their traveling
debts, which ranged from $3,000 to $6,000. They also
feared that their families in Asia would be harmed if the
crime ring was dissatisfied with the payback pace. Some
of the women said they were denied their travel documents
after they had paid their debts. Shih and I Huei Chin
were convicted of prostitution racketeering and sentenced
to federal penitentiaries. Shih's son in Taiwan, the
travel agent, became a fugitive, and another son was sen
tenced to four years. A Taiwanese film director involved
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in the ring, Hung Chang Wang, pled guilty in a California
court and was sentenced to 20 months. {Surovell 40, 42)
Illegal Alien Smuggling
America had an influx of Chinese illegal aliens
after the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. In the
1980s, 108,975 Chinese were illegally smuggled into
America. In January 1991, an estimated 80,000 Chinese
illegal aliens, mainly from Fujian province, were living
in New York City. In 1993, U.S. authorities estimated
that 90,000 mainland Chinese were illegally entering
America each year. Authorities believe each of the aliens
paid about $35,000 to be smuggled into America. Members
of tongs and Chinese gangs smuggle aliens but whether
these members work on behalf of their group or for their
own gain is unknown. Tongs and gangs often associate with
the aliens after they arrive but they don't necessarily
smuggle them. {Chin 229, Elliott 36, Sterling 154)
Fujian is on China's southeast coast and many of the
illegal aliens come from there for two main reasons. They
are subject to the same poverty and repression that those
in China's inland provinces endure, yet due to its loca
tion, the Fujianese are less isolated from the rest of
the world. From friends and relatives, the Fujianese hear
stories about how a Chinese can immigrate to America with
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a few ·hundred dollars in his pocket and start his own
business a few years later. For a Fujianese who earns the
province's average annual salary of $209, the good life
in America is quite enticing. (Kleinknecht 161)
This desire to reach America led to a lucrative
operation for alien smugglers who would come to be known
as "snake heads." The passage fee of $25,000 to $35,000
is an astronomical amount for the average Fujianese but
smugglers assure them the money can be earned in America.
Only a small percentage of the fee is required up front.
Cheng Chui Ping, a Fujian native, was smuggled into
America around 1983 before she and her husband, Cheng
Yick Tak, became New York's first notorious smugglers.
The couple ran the operation out of the Tak Shun variety
store at 145B Hester st. in Chinatown. Ping herself
guided immigrants from Fujian through Hong Kong, Central
America, Mexico and then New York. She usually smuggled
less than 12 immigrants at a time but in all she had
smuggled thousands and made an estimated $30 million
before she was arrested in 1990. Ping was jailed for four
months before she resumed her operation in a building she
bought for $3 million in cash. The Fujianese liked her
and called her "Big Sister Ping." (Kleinknecht 162)
Unlike the emerging smugglers, Ping helped aliens after
they arrived.
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Other criminals began to realize they could make the
same amount of money smuggling aliens as they did smug
gling heroin and serve far less time in jail if caught.
Convicted alien smugglers are typically jailed for a few
months but major heroin smugglers can be put away from 25
years to life. (Kleinknecht 168) Most of these newer
alien smugglers had far less compassion than Ping had.
They turned the smuggling trade into a large-scale opera
tion by cramming hundreds of immigrants onto old, run
down ships. The East Wind, a ship that carried 524 pas
sengers to America in early 1993, took nine days to load.
(Elliott 41) The trip to the Promised Land is pure hell.
Spending months at sea, the passengers eat no more than
one meal a day, usually a small. bowl of rice, and they
often must share one rest room. The male immigrants and
crew mates routinely rape the female passengers and turn
them into virtual sex slaves.
Between August 1991 and June 1993 authorities inter
cepted 14 of these ships and the number that arrived
undetected is unknown. In May 1993, a ship unloaded about
200 immigrants at San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge.
Authorities seized 125 of the aliens but the others
escaped. On June 2, 1993, the coast Guard on the Northern
California coast seized two trawlers carrying about 200
immigrants. The boats landed about 60 miles apart.
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(Kleinknecht 163) on June 6, 1993, a battered rust bucket
called the Golden Venture, with about 300 passengers, ran

aground at night near Rockaway Point of Brooklyn, N.Y.

After months at sea, the worn out, panicky passengers,
many of whom were wearing only underwear, jumped blindly
into the turbulent 55-degree water. The surviving aliens
were jailed. Five bodies washed ashore that night and

five more washed up over the next few days. At the time,
authorities learned that 24 more ships were on the way.
(Kleinknecht 158, 159, 163) Authorities have identified
over 60 smuggling routes by land, sea and air. (Sterling
154) Proof that many of these ships sneak past the Coast
Guard is in Chinatown where many newly-arriving Fujianese
can be found. Since the Tiananmen massacre, America has
granted refugee status to any Chinese requesting it; they
are not prosecuted or deported.
The real tragedy of alien smuggling occurs in China
town. Gangs often enslave the aliens and use barbaric
methods of collecting the passage fees from them. Some
aliens are kidnapped in the middle of the night and
imprisoned and tortured until their families back in
Fujian send the gangsters tens of thousands of dollars.
Police frequently find aliens locked in warehouses and
cramped basements. In May 1993, authorities in Jersey

City, N.J., found four armed criminals guarding 57 aliens
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locked in a warehouse. The aliens were driven in vans
every day to and from low-paying restaurant jobs. In June
1993, New York City police freed 43 aliens from three
makeshift prisons and arrested their 14 captors. Smug
glers often ignore the pre-trip agreements and start
harassing families back home for money when the aliens
arrive. The aliens are often confined and forced into
slave labor in garment factories and restaurant kitchens
until the debt is paid. The prettiest female aliens are
often forced into prostitution. Abused aliens rarely
approach police for help because they assume the police
are as corrupt as the cops in Southern China. And if they
did approach the police, the gangsters could retaliate
and harm the families back home. (Kleinknecht 165) Know
ing they came illegally, the aliens also fear being
returned to China if they approach the police.
Chinatown's most notorious immigrant-smuggling gang,
the Fuk Ching, consisted of hard-core criminals from
Fujian. The gang smuggled immigrants into California,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, North Carolina and other states.
The Fuk Ching frequently kidnap and torture debtors.
(Kleinknecht 168) The gangsters have handcuffed and
beaten aliens in broad daylight on crowded Chinatown
streets. (Chin 229) Often when the gangsters confine and
torture aliens, families back home can hear the screams
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from pain over a telephone. In November 1990, Fuk Ching
members demanded $25,000 from each of two aliens and took
them to an apartment where they were beaten with guns and
sticks. The gangsters then took the aliens to a basement
on 58th Street in Queens to intensify the torture. Over
the next several days, the aliens were burned with ciga
rettes, beaten with an exercise bar and had their heads
covered with plastic bags. The gangsters seriously burned
the debtors and broke some ribs before police freed the
victims. In January 1991, a Hong Kong smuggling ring
hired Fuk Ching members to collect $30,000 from an alien,
Kin Wah Fong. The gangsters took Fong to a Bronx apart
ment, handcuffed him to a bed, beat him with a claw
hammer, and threatened to kill him. Fong's family heard
him beg for his life over the phone. After 12 hours of
torture, police rescued him and arrested 13 gangsters.
(Kleinknecht 168, 169)
Intimidation of Business Owners
Chinese gangs take advantage of business owners by
using four types of intimidation: the demand for protec
tion money, extortion, the forced sale of expensive pro
ducts, and the demand for free or discounted products and
services.
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The gangs often demand business owners to pay pro
tection money to ensure that the demanding gangs or other
gangs will not disturb the business. The gangsters and
the owners often negotiate the payment amounts and the
due dates. The gangsters sometimes tell the owners to
make one large payment. Under gang rules, a gang may only
demand protection money from a merchant that operates in
territory controlled by the gang. (Chin 224) Protection
money is often called po foo fay (protection fee), tor ti
fay (territory fee) or heung yau chin (incense oil
money). (Criminal Investigative Division 36) About 80
percent of San Francisco's Chinese restaurateurs pay from
$200 to $750 per week for each table in their restaurant.
(Sterling 153)
Extortion is a common crime in America's Chinatowns.
The New York City Police Department estimates that Chi
nese gangs have extorted money from at least 80 percent
of the city's Asian merchants. Uncooperative merchants
have been beaten and/or killed and have had their busi
nesses robbed, burned, vandalized and/or burglarized. The
gangs use extortion to gain control of territory. When
two or more gangs are trying to claim the same area, mer
chants in that area can sometimes be forced to pay money
to each gang. Extortion by Chinese gangs is tolerated by
the tongs and is often sporadic and spontaneous. Gang-
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sters give the extorted money to their leader, who dis
tributes it to his underlings at will.

(Chin 224, 226)

Extortion money is often called cha chin (tea money) or

lai si (lucky money). (Criminal Investigative Division
35)
Gangsters often force business owners to buy holi
day-related items from the gangs at highly-inflated
costs. The items can include plants, cakes or firecrack
ers. The gangs take advantage of the Chinese holiday cus
toms of ensuring harmony in the community and of display
ing and consuming certain items during the holidays.
Gangs also demand free or nearly-free goods and ser
vices. This practice resembles theft. Gangsters will
often behave in a business only if the owner gives them
free or discounted goods and services. (Chin 224) This
crime often occurs in restaurants.
In a 1992 survey of New York City's Chinese busi
nesses, Chinese gangsters approached 69 percent of the
603 respondents and had victimized 54.7 percent of the
respondents. On average, the victims were preyed on 10
times a year and lost $615 a year. (Chin 225)
Business owners avoid gang demands by changing their
lifestyles, altering their business practices, installing
security systems, altering their buildings, and trying to
use more English in their businesses.
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Lifestyle changes were made to avoid looking pros
perous and include dressing casual, wearing no jewelry,
carrying little money, and driving inexpensive cars.
Altered business practices include closing earlier
than usual, hiring only acquaintances or friends, keeping
little cash in the building and doing business with only

regular customers. Security systems include alarms, video
cameras and iron gates on the front.
Gangsters with beepers hang around businesses with

pay phones so many of these owners removed the phones.

Gangsters also rob customers in rest rooms so many owners
have put locks on the rest room doors or rebuilt the rest
rooms to accommodate only one person at a time.

Business owners are also hiring more people with

good English skills to have them deal with the gangsters.
Gangsters must be able to communicate to make demands. If
the employee is fluent in English and the gangster is

not, the gangster will get frustrated and likely leave.
Other precautionary measures include hiring managers

who can deal with gangsters, leaving the building in

groups after closing, carrying a gun and hiring non-Chi
nese. (Chin 233, 234)

Violence
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The Hip Sing Association and the on Leong Chinese
Merchants Association were known for their war which
began around 1904 and ended in the 1920s but most vio
lence in the Chinatowns today involves gangs. Gang vio
lence erupts almost weekly in the San Francisco and New
York Chinatowns. Researchers have divided Chinese gang
tumult into three types: intergang, intragang and instru
mental violence.
Intergang violence is conflict between rival gangs
and can be divided into three subcategories.
1. Intergang violence can be used to maintain or
advance a gang's status. Members of one gang feeling dis
respected by members of a rival gang can lead to inter
gang violence. This violence is often committed spontane
ously.
2. One gang trying to acquire another gang's terri
tory, or two gangs trying to seize unclaimed territory
can cause intergang violence. These conflicts are com
monly called turf wars and are often planned. Additional
turf means additional income due to the extortion money
from extra business owners.
3. A desire for revenge can lead to intergang vio
lence. A gang with members who have been attacked by a
rival gang will often seek revenge.
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Intragang violence occurs between members of the
same gang and can be divided into two subcategories: (1)
Gangsters sometimes fight over money, women or how the
gang should proceed; (2) Violence can be used to punish
members who violate gang rules.
Instrumental violence is directed at non-gang mem
bers including those with gambling debts, illegal aliens
with so-called debts, witnesses to crimes, people being
robbed and merchants who refuse to comply with gang
demands. (Chin 230, 231)
But not all violence aimed at non-gang members is
instrumental. Gangsters often injure or kill people for
no reason, such as what happened at the Golden Dragon
restaurant in San Francisco's Chinatown. Many victims are
often innocent bystanders. According to the FBI, the Wah

Ching, the Ghost Shadows and the Fuk Ching are becoming
increasingly violent and frequently commit violent acts
unapproved by the tongs. Execution-style murders and

armed home invasions are on the rise. (Criminal Investi
gative Division 3�) These home invasions, which are also
becoming more brutal, will be discussed in the Robbery
section. New York City's five La Cesa Nostra families
sell guns to Chinese crime groups. (Sterling 152)

Robbery
Small numbers of gangsters typically rob without
gang approval. They generally target residential homes,
vice businesses such as gambling clubs and massage par
lors, and legitimate businesses such as jewelry stores
and restaurants.
To rob a house, heavily-armed gangsters, including
Ghost Shadows and Flying Dragons, will typically follow
people home, enter the home, tie up the occupants,
threaten to kill the children, and then take cash and
valuables. The intruders sometimes rape and kill the
women. (Chin 226, Sterling 153, 154)
Gangsters can often rob thousands of dollars from
patrons at gambling clubs, especially between midnight
and dawn when gambling activity peaks. Gangsters some
times sneak past the guards by posing as gamblers and if
guards are absent, the intruders often brandish weapons
and announce a robbery. Slow-responding gamblers may be
pistol-whipped or killed. Also, the gangs are increas
ingly targeting the massage parlors that opened in the
1980s in New York. Masked Chinese gunman wounded or
killed managers, guards and customers while robbing sev
eral parlors in 1985.
Chinese restaurants have become frequent robbery
sites since many of them accept only cash. Robberies
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occur mainly around closing time when the cash registers
are more likely to be full. Well dressed gangsters posing
as customers have �nuck past guards and security doors to
rob jewelry stores in Chinatown. (Chin 226)
Law Enforcement's Response to Chinese Organized
Crime in America
Some believe that law enforcers were slow to respond
to Chinese organized crime since most of the crime was
confined to the isolated Chinatowns. The crime was out of
sight so it was out of mind. But law enforcers have
become very concerned about Chinese tongs and gangs since
the early 1980s, due mainly to alien and heroin smug
gling. (Elliott 41) The Drug Enforcement Administration
in New York has the Asian Heroin Group, also called Group
41. In 1996, the DEA was planning to open an office in
Beijing. The Immigration and Naturaliza�ion Service has
special task forces in Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, New
York, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., devoted exclu
sively to Chinese crime groups. Law enforcers in Arling
ton, Va., Chicago, Dallas, Monterey Park, Calif., and
Oakland also have resources devoted to Asian or Chinese
crime groups. (Chin 214, U.S. State Department 3)
U.S. authorities frequently work with foreign
authorities when investigating Chinese organized crime
since it is an international problem. The FBI, the intel-
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ligence community and other law enforcement agencies
cooperate in a global strategy to control Southeast Asian
drug traffickers. The FBI gets much of its information on
Chinese crime groups from business and community leaders

in Asia and from Asian leaders in U.S. cities with large
Asian populations. The bureau also has an Organized
Crime/Drug Strategy that made Asian drug traffickers a
priority. (Criminal Investigative Division 2, 27, 54) The
Drug Enforcement Administration trains Chinese officials
in drug enforcement, including a two-week seminar in 1995
in Macau. The Chinese government has expressed interest
in expanding its cooperation with America, especially in
the areas of drug-use prevention and rehabilitation
training. (U.S. State Department 3)
Law enforcers face several obstacles when investiga
ting Chinese organized crime including language and

culture differences. Understanding a wiretapped conver
sation and finding a law enforcer who can infiltrate a
Chinese crime group are often difficult since some Chi
nese communities have over 12 dialects. (Surovell 100) In

1993, only 1.5 percent of the FBI's agents were Asian
American, and the New York City Police Department had

only one officer who could speak the Fujianese dialect.
(Elliott 41)
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The reluctance of Chinese victims to report crime is
a cultural difference that hinders crime solving. Under
Chinese custom, dispute resolution without police
involvement is encouraged. Many Chinese victims tend to
believe that the crimes they experience are too insignif
icant to call the police. Business owners forced to give
money or free goods to gangsters often see the problem as
more of an annoyance than a crime. Some victims believe
police won't try to solve the crime unless it involves
drugs or homicide. Some merchants who refuse to comply
with gang demands believe the demands are not crimes
since no money exchanges hands. Basically, Chinese are
more tolerant of crime than most ethnic groups. (Chin
232, 233)

The FBI originally feared that China's reclaim of
Hong Kong on June 30, 1997, would cause a mass migration
of criminals from the island to America. U.S. law enforc
ers believed Chinese authorities would crack down on the
criminals and scare them away but more recent reports
indicate that Chinese authorities may be more lenient
than expected. As of 1996, the increase in the number of
secret society members applying for emigration to America
was insignificant. Instead, British Colombia saw an
influx of society members due to their ability to take
advantage of Canada's immigration policies. The FBI has
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enhanced its cooperation with Canadian authorities to
keep society activity out of America. U.S. law enforcers
believe that the lucrative criminal opportunities in Hong
Kong and China will keep many of the criminals there.
Also, most society members do not have the means or
opportunity to flee Hong Kong� The upper echelon are the
most likely to leave. (Criminal Investigative Division
12, 41)

CHAPTER VI
A COMPARISON BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND CHINESE
ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA

Introduction
In this chapter we will determine if Russian or
Chinese crime groups pose the gretest threat to American
society. We will explore the differences between the two
groups to determine which one has the most capacity to
harm. Before we begin, we must remember that academics,
journalists and law enforcers agree that La Cosa Nostra
still rules the underworld and will likely continue to do
so for years to come. The success of another ethnic crime
group may depend on its ability to compete with La Cosa
Nostra or its willingness to cooperate with La Cosa Nos
tra.
In our analysis of Russian and Chinese organized
crime in Chapters IV and v we learned that the two groups
may be similar in several ways, specifically their dura
bility and their ability to evade law enforcement. Both
groups are thriving and growing daily, and with new crim
inal opportunities arising, authorities will unlikely
eliminate either group soon. Law enforcers also have the
same difficulty infiltrating the two groups, mainly due
154
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to language and cultural differences. This chapter will
focus on the important differences between the two
groups, including the levels of sophistication, and the
seriousness and diversity of the types of crimes they
commit. We will also compare each group's ability to
operate nationwide and to affect the average American.
The thesis will then conclude by determining which group
poses the greatest threat to American society.
Levels of Sophistication
A group's level of sophistication can significantly
affect its ability to commit complex and devastating
crimes. The most sophisticated group is more likely to
learn English, exploit technology, find more criminal
opportunities, harm the community at large, devise more
unsolvable crimes, improve existing crime methods, maneu
ver through the legal system, and have intelligent mem
bers. We will compare the members of both groups and com
pare the crimes that both groups commit to determine
which group is most sophisticated.
Russia's elite criminals, or "thieves in authority,"
tend to be former government bureaucrats and Communist
Party officials. Many of them are well-educated profes
sionals with strong international connections. The vory v

zakone (thieves in law) are hard-core, professional
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criminals who came to America with enough skills to com
mit complex crimes, such as the fuel tax scam, almost
immediately after arriving. Many of Russia's lower-level
criminals are college graduates and former military per
sonnel. They tend to be younger, less hard-core and less
active in America than members of the other two groups.
Many members of Chinese secret societies may be con
sidered sophisticated but the societies are based mainly
in Hong Kong and their activity in America is limited.
Tong members may also be considered sophisticated but
most of them have legitimate occupations outside of the
their tong and are not criminals. Most gang members are
little more than uneducated street thugs. Many of them
are high school dropouts with poor English skills. Gang
leaders and a minority of tong members commit most of the
Chinese-related sophisticated crime in America.
The Russians' most sophisticated crimes committed so
far in America include the fuel tax scam, the medical
insurance and telecommunications frauds in California,
narcotics and nuclear weapons/materials smuggling, auto
theft, money laundering, and the counterfeiting of credit
cards, currency, traveler's checks, passports and visas.
Some of these crimes, such as the fuel tax scam, were so
complex that authorities had to figure out how they
worked before the criminals could be prosecuted. Crimes
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such as the telecommunications fraud and the counterfeit
ing scams require technological skills. Also, to market
and smuggle nuclear weapons/materials, the Russian mob
sters must know about and understand these complex items.
The Chinese' most sophisticated crimes committed so
far in America include heroin trafficking, money launder
ing and illegal alien smuggling. Their money laundering
methods are not that sophisticated but according to
authorities they tend to be more complex than the methods
used by Russian mobsters in America. The Chinese use
methods that are possibly as complex as the methods used
by Russian mobsters in Russia who launder their proceeds
through America. Both Chinese and Russians employ similar
heroin trafficking methods, especially since both groups
work with other ethnic crime groups such as the Colombian
cartels, but the Chinese are smuggling far more narcotics
into America. To smuggle illegal aliens, the Chinese
developed over 60 routes by air, land and sea.
After comparing the members and crimes of Russian
organized criminals and Chinese organized criminals, we
must conclude that, in general, Russian criminals are
more sophisticated than Chinese criminals.

The Seriousness and Diversity of the Types of Crimes
Russian and Chinese Crime Groups Commit
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The seriousness of a crime can be measured by its
economic, physical, psychological and societal effects.
Economic harm includes the amount of money lost by vic
tims, the amount gained by criminals, the amount taken
from the economy and the amount taken from governments.
Physical harm includes the amount of violence that is
used as a means of internal discipline, as a way to set
tle disputes, as a way to further criminal pursuits, or
for no reason at all. Physical harm also involves the
physical side effects of drug addiction and prostitution.
Psychological harm involves the amount of fear and intim
idation that criminals can instil in people to the point
of altering their behavior. Societal harm involves the
degree to which social and political systems are under
mined.
The diversity of a crime group's activities reflects
the group's willingness to pursue new challenges and its
ability to adapt to new opportunities. The group most
capable of adapting to new opportunities is likely to be
the group most capable of surviving and possibly growing.
Thus, the diversity of a group's activities may help pre
dict the amount of harm the group can inflict on society
in the future.
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We will now analyze each type of crime committed by
Chinese and Russian crime groups to determine which group
commits the most serious crimes.
Crimes of deception and fraud are committed mainly
by Russians and include the fuel tax fraud, the insurance
scams, the bogus import company, the telecommunications
scam in California, and the counterfeiting schemes.
The fuel tax scam causes economic, physical, psycho
logical and societal harm. The scam causes economic harm
because states and the federal government are denied mil
lions of dollars in tax revenue. The perpetrators of this
fraud also sell the fuel at a discount to retailers, who
in turn undersell their honest competitors. The scam can
drive these honest retailers out of business and allow
the dishonest retailers to monopolize the fuel market.
Physical harm occurs when the perpetrators use violence
against their competitors. Psychological harm occurs when
honest retailers are intimidated into buying the daisy
chain fuel or when honest retailers realize they can't
compete with the perpetrators. Societal harm is caused
when the scam corrupts the political system. (Tri-State
31 )

The insurance scams cause economic harm because they
drain millions of dollars from insurance companies and
thus increase premiums for subscribers. The money that

160

subscribers spend on the increased premiums goes to the
mobsters instead flowing productively through the eco
nomy.
The bogus import company that Russian mobsters set
up in 1992 helped them steal $5.7 million from 24 Russian
companies and a Russian charity. Companies in Russia were
robbed but the fraudulent company was set up in America
so the crime occurred in America. The scam caused eco
nomic harm because it drained $5.7 million from legiti
mate Russians. The incident likely harmed the companies
in Russia psychologically, possibly to the point where
they weren't sure if they could ever trust another com
pany in America.
The telecommunications scam in California causes
economic harm because the phone calls made by the mob
sters on their bogus phones are charged to the legitimate
phone owner's account. Thus the legitimate phone owners
who miss the problem on their phone bills inadvertently
pay the illicit charges. If the legitimate phone owners
catch the problem on their bill and do not pay the
illicit charges, the phone company must absorb the loss.
This is money that could be used in the economy. This
crime may cause enough psychological harm to prevent
people from using or buying cellular phones.
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Russian mobsters have mastered counterfeiting. By
illegally copying credit cards, the criminals cause eco
nomic and psychological harm. Economic harm is occurs
because the goods bought with a bogus credit card are
charged to the legitimate card holder's account. The
money used to pay these illicit charges is money that
could have been used in the economy. If the legitimate
card holders catch the problem on their bill and do not
pay the illicit charges, the bank issuing the card must
still pay the retailer where the illegal transaction
occurred. This can cause the bank to increase its inter
est rates for all of its customers to compensate for the
losses. Thus, these customers are sending money to the
banks that could have been used in the economy. This can
cause psychological harm among all credit card holders,
especially victims of the scam, who may then hesitate to
use credit cards.
Chinese criminals in America traffic more narcotics,
especially heroin, than their Russian counterparts here.
This is a crime that can cause harm in many ways. Eco
nomic harm occurs people buy narcotics with money that
could go toward food or shelter. Economic harm also
occurs because of the billions of dollars used to fight
narcotics trafficking. Millions are also spent on treat
ing drug addicts and on treating those who have acquired
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other problems from drug use, such as AIDS. Drug abusers
who lose their jobs can also cause economic problems, and
abusers often steel and commit other crimes to get money
for drugs. Narcotics can cause extensive physical harm to
its users, including AIDS when needles are shared. Also,
violence is often associated with trafficking at the
street level. Narcotics cause psychological harm. Addicts
will spend their lives looking for drugs or looking for
money to buy drugs instead leading productive lives.
Addicts can have their self esteem shattered. Societal
harm occurs when drug abuse leads to ruined families and
ruined relationships. Addiction can often cause divorces
or death. Ruined careers and joblessness can lead to pov
erty and homelessness. Narcotics trafficking may be the
most devastating crime committed by organized crime
groups.
The Russians' smuggling of nuclear weapons/materials
is obviously the crime with the most potential to cause
great physical harm. The amount of harm that illegaly
smuggled nuclear weapons could cause is nearly incalcula
ble. America spends billions of dollars on monitoring
terrorist groups and rogue nations having, or suspected
of having, nuclear weapons. Thus, the crime has economic
effects also. Knowing that terrorists or rogue nations
have nuclear weapons can psychologically harm Americans
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and citizens of countries that America protects, such as
South Korea.
Chinese criminals, not really Russian criminals,
engage in illegal gambling. This crime causes mainly eco
nomic harm since the money spent on gambling goes to
criminals instead of into the legitimate marketplace.
This crime also causes societal harm since the money does
not fund social or government programs as incomes from
state lotteries do.
Auto theft, a Russian activity, causes mainly eco
nomic harm. The crime can be a serious loss for those
without proper car insurance. When insurance companies
cover the loss of a stolen cars, premiums rise for the
companies subscribers. The crime can also cause psycho
logical harm since people will fear that their cars could
be stolen.
Both Chinese and Russian criminals launder their
illicit proceeds. Money laundering in itself may not
cause harm but it allows criminals to continue their
illegal activities. Money laundering's purpose is to hide
how illicit proceeds are made. If law enforcers cannot
determine how the proceeds are made because they've been
laundered, the criminals can continue their illegal
money-making crimes without getting caught.
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Prostitution is mainly a Chinese crime which causes
physical harm. Prostitutes brought in by Chinese are
often forced to work long hours over extended periods of
time. These women are often abused and frequently carry
and spread social diseases. Serious psychological harm
can occur also since the women often work against their
will, and become demoralized just to cope. Sometimes if
the women fail to meet their so-called obligations, their
families in Asia are physically harmed. Prostitution also
causes economic harm since money is spent on sex instead
of going toward something more productive. Also, these
women and/or their families are often forced to pay exor
bitant amounts of money to their employers or captors.
Prostitution can also cause societal harm since afflic
tions like AIDS can spread and since patronizing a
brothel can disrupt the family structure.
Illegal alien smuggling by Chinese leads mainly to
physical and economic harm. Their trip America is often
appalling and dangerous, especially for the women. Smug
glers dissatisfied with how quickly aliens pay back their
smuggling fees often abuse and torture the aliens. Many
of the aliens are often held in near slavery or, if
female, forced into prostitution. Economic harm is caused
because aliens must pay excessive amounts at an unrealis
tic pace. Aliens are seriously harmed psychologically
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when the smugglers torture, or threaten to torture and
kill, the aliens. Families back home are psychologically
harmed when they hear their loved ones being tortured
over the telephone. Societal harm occurs when society
must somehow support aliens with virtually no marketable
skills.
Both Russian and Chinese crime groups commit violent
crimes but Russians are far more careful about who they
target. Russians tend to better plan their violent acts
and tend to attack specific individuals. The far more
senseless Chinese are more likely to kill innocent
bystanders or kill for no reason, such as what happened
at the Golden Dragon restaurant in San Francisco's China
town. Violence obviously causes physical harm. Victims

who survive violence or those who witness violence can be
seriously harmed psychologically. Violence can instill
fear and paranoia, and cause people to change their
behavior, possibly move from the neighborhood where crime
occurred. The loss of a family's breadwinner can lead to
economic hardships for the family. Violence can also lead
to societal harm. Areas where violence frequently occurs

deteriorate.

Chinese criminals are known for intimidating busi
ness owners but Russian mobsters frequently extort money
also. This intimidation causes economic harm since mer-
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chants are forced to pay gangsters money that could sup
port a family, improve the business, or be used in the
legitimate marketplace. Victimized merchants can be
harmed psychologically, as well as other merchants who
may fear they will be victimized. Societal harm occurs
when merchants move to a safer area and cause the area
they leave behind to deteriorate. Physical harm occurs
when noncomplying merchants are injured or killed or have
their businesses vandalized or destroyed.
Chinese criminals are more likely to engage in rob
bery than Russian criminals are. Robbery mainly causes
economic harm due to the monetary losses, or the value of
what is lost, during robberies. Robbery can mean a com
plete loss for its victims or, if the stolen items are
insured, can lead to higher premiums for the insured.
Physical harm can occur also since victims are often
physically violated or killed. Also, homes that have been
invaded are often ransacked. Robbery can seriously harm
victims psychologically, especially if they've been phys
ically violated or have seen someone physically violated.
Robbery can create fear and paranoia and lead victimized
home owners or merchants to move to safer areas. Areas
where robbery is frequent eventually deteriorate, thus
causing societal harm.
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By analyzing the types of crimes that both groups
commit, we can see that the Chinese criminals tend to
provide illegal go9ds and services - heroin, gambling,
prostitution and passage to America - in much the same
way Italian mobsters provided alcohol during Prohibition
and gambling in the 1930s and beyond. Basically, the Chi
nese criminals are black marketeers. The Russians are
large-scale con artists and masters of deception. They
use fraud and scams to rip off people, businesses and
governments. Determining which group commits the most
serious crimes is difficult. We should call it a draw.
But Chapters IV, V and VI indicate that Russian criminals
commit a wider array, or a greater diversity, of crimes.
Out of the Chinese criminals' main crimes, two of them,
prostitution and alien smuggling, are similar and some
what interrelated. The prostitutes and aliens often
arrive together and are treated similarly. The Russians
tend to experiment more and pursue any channel in which
they think money can be made. This indicates that the
Russians may be more capable of adapting and surviving.
Each Criminal Group's Ability to Operate Nationwide
and Affect the Average American
Chinese and Russian organized crime groups differ
most in their ability, or willingness, to transcend their
own ethnic communities. In Chapter IV we learned that
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Russian criminals came to America with the skills that
allowed them to commit sophisticated crimes almost imme
diately after arriving and that they quickly victimized
the community at large. The Chinese criminals' ability or
willingness to transcend their communities is far more
limited. Heroin smuggled in by Chinese criminals has been
distributed beyond the Chinese communities but these
criminals have not directly victimized the general pub
lic, or non-Chinese, extensively. Chinese criminals vic
timize mainly their own people because of the language
and cultural barriers between them and the general pub
lic. These criminals normally don't, and can't, relate to
the rest of America and have little desire to expand into
this larger society that is so alien to them. These lan
guage and cultural barriers prevent Chinese criminals
from corrupting public officials. Without police or
political protection, the criminals' ability to expand
into non-Chinese communities is limited. (Chin 236, 237)
We must conclude that Russian criminals are more
capable and willing to operate nationwide and to affect
the average American.
Expectations
We have concluded that Russian criminals and their
crimes are in general more sophisticated than the crimes
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committed by Chinese criminals. We've also found that the
seriousness of each group's crimes is about the same but
that Russians commit a greater diversity of crimes. Thus,
the Russians are more likely to adapt to new challenges
and opportunities. The discussion also concluded that
Russian criminals are more likely to victimize the gen
eral public. We must then finally conclude that Russian
organized crime, and not Chinese organized crime, poses a
greater threat to American society.
Law Enforcement's Approach to Emerging
Organized Crime Groups
Law enforcers have taken several steps to tackle
emerging crime groups but no one should assume that law
enforcers will be as successful with these groups as they
were with La Cosa Nostra. Authorities today are confront
ing groups with less familiar languages and cultures and
they face new challenges with technology and eased inter
national borders. This thesis will close by offering
goals law enforcers must attain to more effectively bat
tle emerging crime groups.
More money must be allocated to start and fund
crime-fighting units that specialize in investigating
specific emerging crime groups. Agencies that can't
afford to start or fund specialty units should at least
make emerging crime groups a higher priority. Also, fed-
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eral, state, local and international law enforcement
agencies must streamline cooperation between each other.
This will require U.S. law enforcement agencies and for
eign law enforcement agencies to become more compatible.
Some ethnic communities are spreading into several police
jurisdictions within a single metropolitan area, such as
New York or Los Angeles, thus increasing the need for
cooperation at the local level. To ensure continued coop
eration, the proper agencies must be rewarded for crimes
solved.
Police-community relations must be developed or
improved, possibly by having more officers walking their
beats. Earning trust from ethnic communities will
increase the likelihood that witnesses and victims will
feel more comfortable giving information to or seeking
help from authorities. Also, witnesses and victims who
come forward should be given more protection from perpe
trators and/or the associates of perpetrators. This could
include preventing prisoners that witnesses have testi
fied against to be released on bail. (Many immigrants
unfamiliar with the U.S. judicial system view bail as a
form of bribery.)
Authorities must recruit more informants in crime
groups, and agents who can infiltrate crime groups and
understand wiretapped conversations. Authorities must
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make the profession of law enforcement more attractive to
upwardly mobile members of emerging ethnic communities.
This may require agencies to more frequently reward and
promote undercover agents who solve crimes. Also, agen
cies must become more willing to commit to long term
cases and not just cases that will provide quick results.
Finally, penalties must be stiffened for young criminals,
possibly by trying and punishing them as adults.
(Dombrink 415-428)
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